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Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Flr. 
New York, NY 10036-8775 
Attn: ED 00-02
Re: Statements of Independence Concepts
Gentlemen:
I wish to commend you for the excellent job you and your staff have done in formulating 
a conceptual framework for audit independence standards. Quite frankly, I would not change a 
single word (a recommendation I only infrequently make - see my comments dated July 16, 2000 
on the SEC’s independence proposal, a copy of which is attached hereto). Not only is this 
document a logical and clear statement of the factors which must be considered in formulating 
independence standards, it is sufficiently flexible to enable the Board to address the issue of the 
client’s economic importance to the audit firm and audit team, an issue which has too long been 
ignored by the profession the professional literature. I, therefore, encourage you to adopt this 
statement even though it is not in accord with the current thinking o f the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC”) as more fully discussed below.
The major problem with your Exposure Draft is that it is not wholly consistent with the 
SEC’s newly adopted independence standards. Indeed, one of the reasons why I urged the SEC 
not to adopt its proposed independence rule was that it would impair the Board’s ability to adopt 
a conceptual framework. Now, rather than designing the ideal structure for formulating 
independence standards, you are forced to design a structure that must accommodate the 
principles embodied in the SEC’s new rule. This is truly unfortunate and I remain puzzled why 
the public members of the Board encouraged the SEC to proceed with the adoption of its 
proposal.
To be sure, there is much in the SEC’s new rule which is consistent with the Board’s 
proposed Statement of Independence Concepts. For example,
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• The SEC has recognized that the primary goal of independence standards 
is to maximize the reliability of financial data and that independence 
standards are only a means to that end;
• The SEC has recognized that audit independence can never be perfect and 
that a certain degree of impairment can be tolerated; and
• The SEC has adhered to the principle of “independence in appearance” 
and has opted for a “reasonable man” standard to apply that principle.
On the other hand, there are three fundamental differences between the approach taken by 
the Board and the approach taken by the SEC, and those differences are discussed below.
Use of Safeguards
Fundamental to the Board’s proposed conceptual framework is the concept of safeguards; 
i.e., that certain impairments of independence may be sufficiently mitigated by establishing 
safeguards that are likely to assure objectivity and integrity notwithstanding factors which either 
impair or are perceived to impair audit independence. The SEC’s proposal does not evidence 
this concept and the Staff of the SEC has categorically rejected the safeguard approach.
Although the SEC rule does provide for the mitigation of sanctions for certain violations of its 
independence rules if  certain safeguards are in place, that provision is simply designed to 
encourage the use of safeguards without eliminating the violation. From a legal prospective, 
both the client and its auditors could be subject to civil liability claims as a result o f the 
infraction. I consider to be an unfortunate choice on the part o f the SEC.
The Disclosure Concept
The SEC, in dealing with the gray areas of independence impairments, has chosen to 
employ a disclosure concept. Thus, the SEC has mandated the disclosure of certain relationships 
which it believes might be perceived as impairing audit independence. Thus, the SEC considers 
such matters simply to be a “cost of capital” issue or a “business question” and not a “legal 
question.” By requiring public companies to disclose the extent of the non-audit services being 
provided to it by its outside auditors, investors and creditors would be able to decide whether 
reliance upon the auditors’ report entails added risk and their perception o f that added risk will be 
reflected in an increase in the company’s cost of capital. In this way, the company’s board or 
audit committee will have to decide whether it is more beneficial for the company to employ its
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outside auditors to perform non-audit services or to refrain from doing so and possibly enjoy a 
lower cost of capital.
While this concept appears logical on its face and has the advantage o f decentralizing the 
decision-making process, it is flawed in practice. As I pointed out in my letter to the SEC, 
disclosure of non-audit services does not really provide the reader with useful information. At 
best, this is secondary information as it provides the reader with no further understanding of the 
operations, assets or prospects of the subject company. It only addresses the reliability of the 
expertised financial information. Secondly, it does not provide the reader with sufficient 
information to make an informed judgment regarding the reliability of the financial information 
as it does not convey the extent of the audit testing performed by the auditors or the safeguards 
that are in place to assure objectivity and integrity. Equally important, it tells the reader little 
about the importance of the client to the audit firm and the audit team. Lastly, by providing this 
information, the reader is caused to doubt the entire regulatory scheme. Thus, if  the reader 
believes that the performance of non-audit services will likely impair the auditors’ objectivity 
and integrity, he will begin to wonder what the independence rules actually accomplish, if 
anything. Thus, the reader might not only regard the subject company’s financial statements to 
be less than reliable, but also that all audited financial statements are suspect. In this sense, the 
disclosure concept will deter the public’s willingness to rely upon audited financial information, 
not enhance that willingness. In short, it will be counterproductive to the whole purpose of 
having independence standards.
For these reasons, I have come to reject the disclosure approach and believe that the 
Board’s safeguard approach is the best way to address the gray areas of audit independence.
The Carve-Out Concept
In the rule adopted by the SEC, there is an exemption from the limitation on internal audit 
services for companies with less than $200 million in total assets. This is clearly a compromise 
with respect to companies that are not likely to be able to afford their own internal audit 
functions. The Board’s proposed conceptual framework does not appear to embrace such an 
exclusion, notwithstanding its flexible approach. On the other hand, to the extent that small 
public companies are less likely to be able to influence the objectivity o f outside auditors than 
large public companies, this approach may not be inconsistent with the Board’s approach. The 
problem, however, is that if  a small public company is audited by a small CPA firm, the risk to 
audit independence may actually be greater. In short, it is not the size of the client, but rather the 
size of the client in relationship to the size of the audit firm that threatens audit independence.
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The Board’s Dilemma
In the final analysis, the Board must decide whether it wishes to adopt a conceptual 
framework which it believes is in the best interest of the public and the profession or whether it 
will modify its proposal to make it compatible with the rules adopted by the SEC. There can be 
no question that the SEC has the final word on such matters as the Board exists only at the 
pleasure of the SEC which is free to ignore any and all determinations which the Board might 
make. Nevertheless, I strongly urge the Board to stand by its convictions on this issue and not 
acquiesce to the SEC’s position even if this may precipitate the Board’s demise. I so urge the 
Board for two reasons:
(1) By altering its approach to audit independence, the Board will not be able to 
effectively address the issue of the client’s economic importance which is the 
principal (if not the only remaining significant) independence issue; and
(2) The SEC’s rule was not primarily aimed at audit independence, but rather was 
aimed at increasing the relative importance o f the audit practices o f the Big Five 
firms so as to make them effectively subject to regulation. Thus, the SEC’s rule 
should not be considered of precedential value to the Board’s determination.
The SEC’s rule addressed the issues of when consulting and legal services, among others, 
impair audit independence. If also addressed the financial interests in clients and entities within 
a mutual fund complex and client employment issues. At best, these areas are now only subject 
to minor interpretation and hardly justify the Board’s further existence. Indeed, considering the 
four “guiding principles” which the SEC has adopted, any such interpretation is likely to be a 
thankless task as these principles provide no useful guidance. Thus, if  there is any reason to 
continue the Board’s existence, it is to develop a standard for addressing the client’s economic 
importance to the audit firm and audit team.
From my perspective, this cannot be achieved without some means of assuring audit 
objectivity and integrity when it passes beyond the limits of the reasonable man standard. In 
such cases, one would have to conclude that certain companies which are dominant in a given 
geographic area simply cannot receive an independent audit. For example, is there an audit team 
or audit office with such a broad spectrum of work that it could remain viable without the 
continued audit business of a Walmart, Caterpillar, Dupont, Kodak or Microsoft. Each of these 
companies is the dominant economic force in their community, and the loss o f their audit 
business would be the death knell of the audit office servicing the account. Thus, the only way to
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maintain the objectivity of the audits of these companies is to have the audit determinations 
reviewed and approved by persons working in other offices whose compensation and continued 
employment by their firm would not be adversely affected by the loss of the client. Even if  a 
disclosure concept works (which I do not believe is the case for the reasons discussed above), it 
would not be sufficient to offset this factor as no reasonable investor should give any more 
credence to an audit report rendered by an auditor whose continued livelihood depends upon the 
preservation o f the client relationship than a set of financial statements published by the client 
alone. In such cases, knowledge only makes the user better aware o f the problem, but does not 
serve to limit the risks faced by the user. It is for this reason that I believe that if  the Board is to 
serve any further useful purpose it must adhere to the safeguard approach.
Secondly, I have concluded that the SEC proposed its new rule, not in an effort to 
establish clear and viable independence standards (as the Board was well on its way to achieving 
that goal), but rather to address a problem which the Board is not empowered to address; namely, 
the fact that the Big Five accounting firms are deriving a diminishing percentage of their 
revenues and profits from their audit practices. Thus, the day is not far off when such firms 
might simply decide to abandon their audit practices in view of their high potential for liability 
claims and their relatively low level of profitability. The decision o f Andersen Consulting to 
sever its ties with Arthur Andersen underscores this possibility. Thus, I believe that the SEC was 
seeking to cause the Big Five firms to limit their consulting practices so that their audit practices 
would remain at the core o f their operations. In this way, the SEC would avoid the nightmare of 
the Big Five firms’ simply informing the SEC that they no longer wished to engage in a public 
company audit practice.
While this may sound implausible, it does explain many of the stranger aspects of the 
SEC’s recent actions; to wit:
• It explains why the SEC chose to promulgate an independence standard 
which did not address the all-important economic importance issue:
• It explains why the SEC has devoted so much emotional and political 
capital to this issue even thought there was neither a public outcry for this 
action, one or more notorious cases of non-audit services leading to audit 
failures, nor statistical evidence supporting this conclusion;
It explains a number of anomalies in the SEC’s proposal such as why the 
SEC sought to prohibit legal advice but not tax advice;
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• It explains why the SEC has pushed for independence investigations 
within the Big Five firms, but has taken no enforcement action with 
respect to even the serious violations that have been uncovered;
• It explains why the SEC has chosen to prohibit contingent fees and 
commissions but not regulate total fees;
• It explains why the SEC was willing to jeopardize the continued existence 
of the ISB when the ISB represents the best hope of addressing the 
economic importance issue;
• It explains why the SEC was so vehement in contending that its proposal 
does not affect non-Big Five firms when its proposal made no such 
distinction;
• It explains why the SEC chose to negotiate the final provisions of the rule 
with the Big Five firms rather than simply base its rule on the public 
submissions as is customary in agency rulemaking;
• It explains the very personal attacks by the SEC on the AICPA and its 
leadership and the SEC’s efforts to divide them from the AICPA members 
who practice in small firms; and
• It also explains why the SEC was simultaneously lobbying for enhanced 
public participation in the POB and the AICPA’s disciplinary processes.
Robert Elliott, the former Chairman of the AICPA, perhaps first identified this possibility 
when he characterized the SEC’s independence proposal as a “solution in search of a problem.” 
To be sure, the SEC perceived there to be a problem; however, it was one which the Congress 
had not empowered the SEC to address. For this reason, the SEC chose to address it with the 
only power it had — its authority to define audit independence. Thus, the Board should not 
interpret the SEC’s rule as one designed to assure audit independence, but rather one intended to 
prevent regulatory independence.
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Conclusion
Again, I wish to commend the Board for its superb Statement of Independence Concepts 
and to encourage the Board to adopt it and to press forward with a statement addressing the 
overall economic importance of the audit client.
Very truly yours
Dan L. Goldwasser
/mbb
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INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD 20 December 2000
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft: Statement of Independence Concepts.
Immediate Response.
Dear Board:
This is my immediate response to your Exposure Draft 
Statement of Independence Concepts. My remarks below address the 
definition of Independence.
Your standard needed a definition of Independence, and now 
you have one. Good. The definition includes an objective, 
reasonable person clause: "or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise." This is good.
The definition, however, still has a lot of deficiencies:
1. Generally, the ED definition is more imprecise than it 
could or ought to be. The words "pressure," "other factors," 
"compromise," and "ability" are too fuzzy. I am especially 
concerned that an essential element of the definition relies on 
the auditor's "ability" to make unbiased decisions. Arguments 
over what are persons' "abilities" will go on for ever.
2. The concept of risk ought be overtly in the definition 
because it is so essential to the meaning of auditor 
independence. Just look at how often the word "risk" appears in 
the ED. Put it in the definition if it is that important, which 
it is.
3. "Unbiased" is a modern day term: Instead use the term 
"impartial" because that was the term used during 1932-1934 
lawmaking hearings which caused the independence requirement to 
be inserted into the bills eventually becoming the U.S. 
securities laws. I believe it is beneficial to liken the 
required impartiality of an auditor (accountant-examiner) to that 
of a judge. Using the word impartial or impartiality makes this 
connection better. I prefer an impartial judge to an unbiased 
judge. "Impartial" is a stronger term than "unbiased." We need 
judges and auditors who are impartial, not just "unbiased."
4. As I have stated before, I find it regrettable that the
ED makes no reference whatsoever to the state of affairs which 
gave birth to the U.S. securities laws and to the insertion of 
the independence provisions into those laws. These sources of 
the independence requirement cannot be legitimately ignored by 
any person or body charged with the duty of producing an 
authoritative definition of independence warranting any public 
support. One gets the impression that the Board so dislikes the 
legal system and the professionals who participate directly in it 
that the Board has purposefully chosen to ignore that system in 
producing an independence definition notwithstanding that that 
system is the mother of the modern day audit profession. This 
attitude toward the law is the profession's roadblock to 
meaningful progress, even when the job of making progress is 
handed to it on a silver platter as is the case of the SEC 
handing the job to the Board in this case. I have previously 
informed the task force and the Board where it might begin its 
acquisition of this knowledge; see Committe citation below.
5. The following definition of independence is a much 
better definition:
Free from relationships that a reasonable person 
would expect to increase the risk of the accountant 
examiner losing judgment-making impartiality.
Committe, Bruce Edward, "Independence of Accountants and
Legislative Intent,” 41 Administrative Law Review 33, 53 (1989).
Sincerely
Bruce Committe, CPA
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INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD 23 December 2000
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft: Statement of Independence Concepts.
Extended Response.
Dear Board:
In a letter dated 20 December 2000 I sent my immediate 
response to the Exposure Draft on Statement of Independence 
Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence (ED). 
Now I provide an extended response in the format of answering the 
five questions which appear on pages iii thru iv of the ED under 
the same headings I use below.
DEFINITION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
As I previously stated on 20 December 2000, the proposed ED 
definition of independence uses words and terms that are too 
fuzzy, indirect, and indefinite in their meaning ("other 
factors," "compromise," "unbiased," and "auditor's ability."
Too, the definition appears to come out of thin air rather than 
from logical and orderly development of ideas using authoritative 
sources which would be, and are, the transcripts reporting 1932- 
1934 hearings leading to insertion of the accountant-examiner 
independence requirement into Congressional bills that eventually 
became The Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act 
of 3934. The failure of the ED even to make reference (much less 
make use of its content) to the one and only research report of 
Congress' 1932-1934 consideration of the accountant-examiner 
independence requirement is inexcusable and likely is best 
explained by the fact that too many Board members have a large 
indirect, but certain, financial interest in the outcome of its 
work, that is, in whether CPA firms can continue lucrative but 
conflicting consulting work along side their independent audit 
work otherwise pursuant to the requirements of the federal 
securities laws. See research report: Committe, Bruce Edward, 
"Independence of Accountants and Legislative Intent," 41 
Administrative Law Review 33, 53 (1989).
The term "risk" should appear directly in the definition.
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The following definition is based on the hearing transcripts 
referenced above, and the Board should adopt it instead of the 
one now proposed:
Free from relationships that a reasonable person 
would expect to increase the risk of the accountant 
examiner losing judgment-making impartiality.
GOALS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The goal is not to report reliance on any "process.” Too, 
those who make, and others who do not make but are nevertheless 
interested in, wealth distribution decisions have more on their 
mind than just "market efficiency." The goal of auditor 
independence is to produce information that is trustworthy as to 
its content and useful to the public in making wealth allocation 
decisions, including, but not limited to, wealth allocation 
decisions made within the environment of what is now conceptually 
well known as the traditional and developing capital markets.
CONCEPTS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The ED proposes four basic concepts of auditor independence: 
threats, safeguards, independent risk, and significance of 
threats/effectiveness of safeguards. These should be replaced 
with the following single concept: The auditor must eliminate and 
avoid risks to his or her independence by avoiding all 
relationships that a reasonable person would expect to increase 
the risk of the accountant examiner losing judgment making 
impartiality. Note how this basic concept and principal tracks 
the above quoted definition of independence. Whenever concerns 
of independence arise, determining the appropriate action to take 
requires merely asking and answering the question whether such 
stated risk is present given any set of facts. Simple is better.
RISK MODEL
Forget the model stuff. The risk model appears to be a back 
door way of inserting the concept of materiality into the 
proposed independence rule. The reasonable person concept in 
both the ED definition and my above proposed definition take care 
of any materiality factor relevant to a rule on independence.
That is, the reasonable person idea subsumes the idea of 
materiality. Note that my above proposed definition of 
independence has the word "risk" built in; that is, there is no 
need for a side bar discussion of "threats," "safeguards," "cost- 
benefits," etc. Such matters are common sense, and do not 
deserve special mentioning. By mentioning them and not other 
relevant concepts they take on more importance than they should. 
Such side bar discussions merely detract from the definition.
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Keep it simple. Human concepts like "independence" are 
best not reduced to models as humanity is too complex for such 
simplifications that might work well outside the social sciences. 
Models are useful devices for academic thought development within 
the social sciences, but they can are not useful in societal 
rulemaking the purpose of which is to describe behavior the 
violation of which is to be the basis for public sanctions.
OTHER ISSUES
If the Board still expects to produce its independence 
conceptual framework without any significant attention given to 
the independence idea developed and contained in 1932-1934 
hearings eventually leading to insertion of the independence 
requirement into the statute, at the very least the Board ought 
to explain, in its proposed independence conceptual framework, 
why it has chosen to ignore such lawmaking authority.
To determine whether the definition of audit independence 
proposed in this letter is better than the one proposed in the ED 
I ask that the Board perform the following test: As a group, 
read both definitions aloud, one after the other, and let each 
Board member immediately after the reading aloud choose for 
himself or herself which one sounds better (seems more logical). 
Each writes his or her choice on paper. Then, let each Board 
Member reveal his or her choice and state the reasons why the one 
each selected sounds better (seems more logical). Those reasons 
can form the basis for fleshing out the conceptual framework 
beyond the mere definition. If those participating in the test 
drop whatever agendas they bring to the table from those who sent 
them there, I believe the proposed definition that I have 
offered will be selected by most, if not all, members of the 
group.
The reason that my proposed definition will seem more logical 
is because its source is collective experience (revealed in 1932- 
1934 Congressional hearings which focused on the problem that 
Congress planned, in part, for the independence requirement to 
solve), and experience, especially in the social sciences, is a 
very powerful (though not full proof) learning tool and guide 
post as to what makes sense (is more logical). Too, the
definition that I propose is a simple collection of a lot of 
experience, and such simplifictions, or reductions, are usually 
more appreciated because of their immediately recognizable better 
utility.
CONCLUSION
The ED has ignored the circumstances, events, and therefore 
the purposes which have given rise to the legal requirement that 
accountant examiners be independent in performing audit services 
required by the U.S. and other securities laws. The ED appears
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to be a hodge podge of ideas very much influenced by those who 
have a desire to retain the current conflicts of interest which 
exist when public accounting firms provide both audit and non­
audit services sometimes to the very same business entity; what 
other explanation could there be for ignoring the prelude to the 
legal audit independence requirement?
For all the reasons stated above, the ED should consist of 
the entire contents of Committe, Bruce Edward, "Independence of 
Accountants and Legislative Intent," 41 Administrative Law Review 
33, 53 (1989) wherein the last sentence reports the definition of 
audit independence quoted above at the top of page 2 of this 
extended response letter.
Sincerely
4
3wallmans@foliofn.co 
m (Steven Wallman)
12/25/00 05:44 PM 
Please respond to 
wallmans
To: "Arthur Siegel (E-mail)" <ASiegel@cpaindependence.org> 
cc:
Subject: Conceptual Framework ED
Arthur - Happy Holidays.
I read the November 2000 ED on independence and thought it was a great step 
forward. Congratulations on making progress. I hope 2001 is a good year 
for you.
Steven M.H. Wallman
wallmans@foliofn.com
FOLIOfn Inc.,
8401 Old Courthouse Road
Vienna, Virginia 22182
703.245.4000; F: 703.245.4943
www.foliofn.com
What's Next.
This email message and any files transmitted with it are confidential 
intended only for the person(s) to whom this email message is addressed. If 
you have received this email message in error, please notify the sender 
immediately by telephone or email and destroy the original message without 
making a copy. Thank you.
4RALPH S. SAUL
3030 ONE LOGAN SQUARE 
18TH & CHERRY STREETS
P.O. BOX 7716 
PHILADELPHIA, PA ,9192
December 26, 2000
Dear Art:
This letter responds to you request of December 14,
2000 for comments on the Board’s exposure draft of a 
"Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence".
My major comment on the exposure draft relates to 
the impact of the SEC’s recent revision of the Commission’s 
Auditor Independence Requirements upon this project and 
the broader issue of the future role of the Board. It 
would appear that the SEC’s rule amendments regarding 
auditor independence have preempted not only the proposed 
conceptual framework but most of the future work of the 
Board.
The definition of auditor independence in the draft 
would appear to be preempted by the Preliminary Note to 
Rule 2-01 and by Rule 2.01(b). Not only does the Commission 
set forth a general standard for auditor independence in 
Rule 2.01 but it also sets forth factors in the Preliminary 
Note that it will consider in determining whether a rela­
tionship or the provision of a service compromises inde­
pendence. Moreover, the Preliminary Note in the Commission's 
rule further preempts the Board’s work by going on to say 
that registrants and accountants are encouraged to consult 
with the Commission’s Office of the Chief Accountant before 
entering into relationships, including relationships in­
volving the provision of services, that are not explicitly 
described in Rule 2-01. The Commission makes no reference 
in Rule 2.01 to the future role of the Board - a Board which 
the Commission itself created.
If this action by the Commission were not enough to 
undermine the Board’s work, the Chief Accountant, in his 
December 6, 2000 speech at the 28th Annual National Confer­
ence on Current SEC Developments, appears to reject the 
Board's entire conceptual framework because it does not 
incorporate the four basic principles in the Commission's 
Preliminary Note and the appearance concept in Rule 2.01.
As you know, the Commission over the past year has 
urged the profession to strengthen its self-regulation 
and it has praised the efforts of the Public Oversight 
Board to act as overseer of the various professional bodies, 
including the ISB, devoted to improving the quality of 
audits of publicly held companies. The majority of our 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness adopted this approach in its 
report by asking the SEC to exercise restraint in its 
rule making authority by delegating to the Board the 
determination of any services that audit firms may not 
provide to their clients. We also recommended that the 
Board identify factors to be considered by auditors, audit 
committees and client management in determining whether 
a specific non-audit service is appropriate.
It is unfortunate that the Commission rejected this 
approach but instead came forward with its own rule which 
in the end echoed the Panel’s recommendations and followed 
the directions in which your Board appeared to be heading.
In my view, this Commission, by choosing to regulate 
directly, has seriously weakened your efforts and the future 
efforts of the POB to act as a strong self-regulator for 
the profession.
I have not provided detailed comments on the conceptual 
framework, Art, because I think it is vital that the Board, 
working with the POB, first determine its future role and 
its relationship with the Commission. In my view, that 
relationship must be based on the principle that the 
auditing profession should regulate itself through a 
strengthened POB, as well as ISB, as recommended by the 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness. I think experience over 
the next several years will demonstrate the wisdom of 
that recommendation.
Sincerely,
cc: William T. Allen, Chairman
Independence Standards Board
Charles A. Bowsher, Chairman 
Public Oversight Board
Shaun F. O'Malley, Chairman 
Panel on Audit Effectiveness
Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
5Tom Horton 
< thorton@stetson.ed 
u>
To: isb@cpaindependence.org 
cc:
Subject: Exposure Draft: Statement of Independence Concepts
12/29/00 10:36 AM
Attention: Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Dear Mr. Siegel:
This conceptual framework, in my opinion, strikes just the 
right balance. I have no suggestions for change. 
Congratulations on the achievement of a difficult task.
Sincerely,
Thomas R . Horton
6University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Business
Grainger Hall
975 University Avenue 
Madison, Wisconsin 53706-1323
January 20, 2001
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Board Members:
Please find enclosed a copy of a paper that we are submitting as part of the comment process 
for the Statement of Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor 
Independence (ED 00-2).
The paper, "Antecedents and Consequences of Independence Risk: Framework for Analysis," 
presents a framework that examines how incentives that may increase independence risk 
interact with environmental and other factors to affect actual or perceived audit quality. We 
explore the combined effects of direct incentives (e.g., direct investments, potential 
employment), indirect incentives (e.g., interpersonal relationships), and iudgment-based 
decisions (e.g., difficult accounting issues, materiality decisions, audit conduct decisions) on 
independence risk. We also explore factors that may mitigate independence risk, such as 
corporate governance, regulatory oversight, auditing firm policy and culture, and individual 
auditor characteristics. Where relevant, we discuss findings from academic research as they 
relate to the elements of our framework and provide an analysis of the effects of independence 
risk on various stakeholders. We conclude the paper with suggestions for future actions by the 
auditing profession, auditing firms, regulators, and academic researchers.
While the primary goal of the framework in our article is to provide direction for future 
academic research, we believe that it also may be useful to the Independence Standards Board 
for analyzing the issues identified during the Board’s consideration of the Conceptual 
Framework Exposure Draft. Our comments, detailed specifically below, address your request 
for input with particular emphasis on your Question Four.
Question Four: "What are your views on the appropriateness of the independence risk model?
Is there research that the Board should be made aware of that would be helpful in expanding
the model or otherwise making it more useful for independence decision makers?"
We believe that you have developed a potentially useful independence risk framework and 
one that shares a number of similarities to the one presented in our article. For example, the 
threats and safeguards articulated in the Conceptual Framework correspond to our analysis of
1
environmental conditions and mitigating factors relating to independence risk (see p. 25 in the 
enclosed paper).
However, while there is overlap between our frameworks, ours differs from yours in the 
following respects. First, our framework is more comprehensive in its discussion of factors 
that contribute to possible threats to auditor independence (paragraph 11 in the Conceptual 
Framework). For example, as discussed above, our framework includes a discussion of 
various judgment-based decisions that allow independence risk to affect audit quality (e.g., 
pressure on difficult accounting issues, pressure on materiality judgments, and pressure on 
audit scope and conduct). We believe that without a judgment-based decision, no mechanism 
other than compromised integrity enables the threats to auditor independence to result in 
reduced audit quality (see pp. 6 - 8 and p. 25 in the enclosed paper). We encourage the Board 
to consider adding this type of discussion to the Conceptual Framework to better 
communicate to all independence constituencies (auditors and non-auditors) the contexts in 
which threats to independence arise.
We believe that the Board’s discussion of the safeguards to auditor independence is relatively 
complete and is consistent with our analysis of mitigating factors. We prefer the method 
whereby you categorize the safeguards according to where they reside (paragraph 14a of the 
Conceptual Framework) because it is from the perspective of these various independence 
constituencies that actions could be taken to respond to independence risk. We view the two 
perspectives outlined in paragraphs 15 and 16 as secondary in describing the nature of these 
actions and we believe that these should not be presented as alternatives to the discussion in 
paragraph 14.
We are particularly interested in the idea of audit firm culture with respect to important 
safeguards, and our paper proposes an audit firm culture continuum that you may wish to 
consider as you further develop the Conceptual Framework (see p. 12 - 15 and p. 26 in the 
enclosed paper). We believe that explicit and implicit auditing firm messages regarding 
appropriate conduct within the firm likely have a significant impact on independence risk. We 
propose an auditing firm culture continuum anchored by a "public duty culture" on one end 
(lowest independence risk) and a "client advocacy culture" on the other end (highest 
independence risk). This type of characterization may be helpful to the Board in clarifying 
"advocacy threats" (paragraph 12c of the Conceptual Framework).
Other Comments
In paragraph 23 of the Conceptual Framework, a continuum of independence risk is 
introduced as a way to characterize levels of independence risk that might trigger action by 
independence decision makers. While the continuum is useful for illustrating the range of 
independence risk, the discussion in paragraphs 24-26 may imply a higher level of precision 
in implementation than the Board intends. For example, based on the discussion in paragraph 
25, it is unclear whether action will be triggered by independence decision-makers when 
independence risk is judged as at or below the remote level. Given that the Board introduces 
the continuum and notes specific points along it, explicit discussion of "trigger" points seems
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appropriate. Alternatively, it may be preferable to introduce the continuum by describing only 
its endpoints, avoiding concerns over unnecessary specificity. Another concern regarding the 
wording in the continuum is that the terms "remote" and "probable" are not unambiguously 
defined. We caution the Board that this type of wording may lead to implementation 
difficulties in the future.
With respect to the discussion of costs and benefits within the Conceptual Framework, one 
cost that is not discussed, but that is in our framework (see the section "How are stakeholders 
affected by independence risk?", p. 16), is the cost that other auditors, the broader profession, 
and capital markets may bear when an individual auditor assumes a level of independence risk 
that leads to a decline in audit quality. This can be viewed as one of the "second order" 
effects in that it represents an externality that arises when an individual auditor does not fully 
internalize the costs of his or her actions on the profession as a whole and on the efficient 
allocation of capital. The Board might consider adding such a discussion, because such 
externalities provide an important motivation for regulation and enforcement — i.e., 
independence rules. As recognized in the Conceptual Framework, it is difficult to measure 
the costs and benefits of public goods such as financial statements and audit opinions. The 
Board may wish to refer to a similar discussion in this regard by accounting standard setters 
(see FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, paragraphs 133 - 140).
In addition to the above comments, you may find our summary of prior auditor independence­
relevant research helpful (see footnotes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13 in the enclosed 
paper).
Please feel free to contact any of us if you have questions about our paper.
Sincerely,
Terry WarfieldKarla Johnstone 
Assistant Professor 
kjohnstone@bus.wisc.edu
Associate Professor 
twarfield@bus.wisc.edu
Enclosure
Cc: Michael H. Sutton
3
ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF INDEPENDENCE RISK: 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Karla M. Johnstone a 
Assistant Professor of Accounting
Michael H. Sutton b
Former Chief Accountant, United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
Visiting Professor of Business Administration
Terry D. Warfield a 
Associate Professor of Accounting
7
Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: ED 00-2
Thomas J Reilly Jr
Suite 2600
1601 Market Street 
Philadelphia PA 19103-2499
January 24, 2001
Dear Mr. Siegel:
The ED of the ISB’s conceptual framework is well thought-out and comprehensive. After 
reading the ED I have only one comment/suggestion. This deals with the emphasis or relative 
importance of safeguards listed in paragraph 14.
My suggestions are based on 31 years experience with a Big 5 firm (including serving as 
internal quality control review partner for several U.S. and non-U.S. offices), two years as a 
member of an audit committee of a public company and four years as an “independent 
director” of three private companies.
I believe that the most important safeguard is the value that firms and individual auditors 
place on their reputations, followed very closely by the auditee’s “tone at the top.” Without 
very high personal integrity underlying those two safeguards, the remaining safeguards are of 
relatively little value. I therefore suggest a reordering of the safeguards in paragraph 14 to 
emphasize those two and would reorder the remainder based on my experience on both sides 
of the table (original # ’s in parenthesis):
1 Value of reputations (1)
2 Auditee’s “Tone at the Top” (4)
3 Legal Liability (7)
4 General Oversight (3)
5 Peer Review programs (2)
6 Rules, standards, etc. (5)
7 Disciplinary Actions (6)
Sincerely,
Retired Partner -  Arthur Andersen LLP
Copy to: Dr. Henry R. Jaeniche, Drexel University
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February, 2001
Independence Standards Board, 6th Floor 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear ISB Members:
The comments below are offered in response to the release of ED 00-2. They bear on the ED's 
definition of Auditor Independence and the terminology employed for concepts of the Risk Model. 
Yours truly,
Edward R. Scott
Independence Definition: -
Practitioner Reference:
As this exposure draft purports to provide a conceptual model for auditor independence it would 
seem that a better definition of auditor independence might be as follows:
Auditor Independence is the objective application of auditing procedures.
As stated in paragraph #33 objectivity is the ability to make unbiased audit decisions. Such a definition 
would be consistent with General Standard #2 requiring an independence of mental attitude on the part of 
the auditor.i As Carmichael observes "independence of mental attitude" has historically served as the 
conceptual definition of auditor independence:
There has been an official definition of audit
independence since Generally Accepted Auditing Standards were first 
proposed in 1947 (Tentative Statement of Auditing StandardsTheir 
Generally Accepted Significance and Scope). Essentially the same 
definition exists today in AU section 220 of the AICPA’s codification of 
auditing standards.
This concept of "practitioner independence" is recognized in the classical treatise by Mautz and Sharaf 
when they say:
We can agree with those who contend that independence is basically a 
state of mind.ii
In an empirical study of professional sanctions Moriarity in a recent study noted that sanctions against 
members of the AICPA for independence violations have increased at a lesser rate than have those for 
violations of auditing standards. Although no tests were conducted here to assess the likelihood of the 
sanctions being from populations of equal proportion or even opposite in magnitude these results would 
seem to suggest that the conceptual definition in use is providing appropriate guidance to members of the 
profession.iii In addition, Barry Melancon, the President of the AICPA, has noted that the SEC has never 
brought an action alleging a lack of auditor independence.
Even the SEC enforcement director has admitted the commission has never 
brought a case alleging that an audit failure occurred as a result of the 
accounting firm's lack of independence. iv
Although, as ED paragraph #44 states, the auditor's state of mind can never be known by the 
independence decision maker, it is the auditor's state of mind that is if fact of particular relevance. 
Paragraph #6 makes clear that conformity to a set of rules alone is not sufficient when it states:
To be independent, an auditor must be able, and be reasonably expected 
to be able, to overcome pressures and other factors that would prevent 
unbiased audit decisions. Accordingly, the absence of a rule violation 
does not mean that the auditor is independent
The "state of mind" criterion is also conceptually consistent with the personal attributes approach taken in 
the exposure draft.
Construction:
In addition, it conforms to the rules for the construction of connotative definitions which require 
that a definition be stated in the affirmative rather than negative. v vi That is it stipulates the distinguishing 
property of independence which can exist although a lack of freedom from influences that might lead to bias 
may not. Just as one have fuel, oxygen, and heat without a fire the presence of a potentially biasing 
influence may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to actually result in bias. Also, the definition 
offered in the exposure draft requires a complete specification of the "pressures and other factors" to give it 
meaning whereas the above definition is complete in and of itself.
As noted in paragraphs #37-39 the personal attributes approach adopted places a focus on the 
individual auditor rather than an enumeration of the various relationships that might lead to a compromise 
of independence. The suggested definition is more consistent with the adopted approach. Efforts to 
combine an operational definition of independence with a "genus and difference" definition risks 
conflicting extensions of the definition itself. Thus, one may conclude that an auditor is independent by 
virtue of having none of the enumerated and prohibited relationships while an as yet unspecified 
relationship may be a substantial Bias Factor. Although ED #49 seems to sanction an operational 
definition of independence when it states:
An auditor is independent when independence risk is at an acceptably 
low level, as determined by a particular independence decision maker.
such a definition seems more consistent with a rules approach to defining independence than to the 
personal attributes approach. This statement provides an operational definition of independence as 
opposed to a conceptual one. It is the equivalent of explaining a straight line as the result of placing a ruler 
on a page and drawing a pencil along one side.
Furthermore, as observed in the exposure draft complete freedom from potentially biasing 
conditions is an impossible state of affairs considering the client fee payment arrangement. As Mautz and 
Sharaf also observe the very institutional arrangements or environment in which the auditor performs his 
work contaminates his independence in the minds of users.vii These institutional factors may be as 
significant to the user's evaluation of auditor independence as any potentially compromising personal 
factors. The ED definition, therefore, is unattainable whereas the one suggested is at least conceptually 
achievable, a desired condition as stated in ED paragraph #41. In addition, a definition such as that 
suggested offers a concept to which anyone involved in any attest engagement, whether a public company 
or not, could subscribe. Although not the ISBs obligation internal consistency with other pronouncements 
and standards would, nevertheless, seem a desirable property.
Profession Reference: 
Whether this pillar of the profession is significant to a user is a matter of argument. Conventional 
wisdom holds that it is independence of the audit that gives value to the auditor's opinion. The idea of 
auditor independence is so ingrained that it's significance is never examined. As Mautz and Scharaf note:
The significance of independence in the work of the independent auditor is 
so well established that little justification is needed to establish this concept 
as one of the cornerstones in any structure of auditing theory.viii
However, it may instead be that the value added by an audit opinion is derived from an 
existence of auditing standards as they apply to the application of auditing procedures coupled with 
the legal implications for failure to observe them. Again, as Melancon notes the SEC has never brought 
an action for a lack of independence, only for substandard audit work.ix It should be observed that the 
mere presence of independence in and of itself is no defense against a failure to perform required audit 
procedures satisfactorily. Instead it merely asserts that in the absence of motive the auditor may be 
presumed to have performed his job for the benefit of the user. It hardly matters to a user that his loses
were the result of an independent auditor doing his work poorly or from an auditor lacking independence 
doing his work poorly. Either way he will look to the legal system for a redress of grievances.
As useful as this presumption of independence may be for refuting legal claims it may not be as 
critical to the profession as conventional wisdom would lead one to believe. For example, investors have 
always committed large sums of money to investments on the basis of broker recommendations. However, 
it is well known that broker's have no requirement of independence.
Legal Dimensions:
finally, a focus on "mental attitude" may preserve for the auditor a defense against a prima facia 
case established by a claimant arising from a difference in the risk assessment of a potentially biasing 
condition. The traditions of our legal system place the burden of proof on a claimant in cases of 
negligence. Violation of an auditor's professional duty to provide an objective application of auditing 
procedures should remain the standard of proof rather than a mere appearance of compromised 
independence resulting from a violation of an independence rule. An accidental or unknown violation 
could expose the auditor to liability when in fact he has performed a "quality audit."
Terminology:
"Threats" is a term filled with negative emotional implications. "Bias Factors" or some other term with a 
more benign connotation would be preferable. As Kemeny states, "A philosopher is supposed to be free of 
emotions, and hence philosophical discussions are supposed to avoid such words."x It would seem this 
same criterion ought to apply to any conceptual model developed by the ISB.
i Douglas Carmichael, CPA Journal, May 1999
ii Robert Mautz and Hussein Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association,
1961, p. 206
iii Shane Moriarty, "Trends in Ethical Sanctions Within the Accounting Profession," Accounting Horizons, 
December 2000.
iv Barry Melancon, "The Proposed SEC Rule on Auditor Independence and its Consequences", Journal of 
Accountancy, October 2000, p. 26 - 28. It should be noted that a lack of auditor independence may
correlate highly with a substandard performance of audit procedures. Since evidence of the later may be 
more relevant to a proof of injury by a claimant than a lack of independence it may be that the quality of 
the audit has been the subject of SEC actions although the substandard audit may have stemmed from a 
lack of independence. There is currently no evidence to my knowledge to support either position. 
v Introduction to Logic, 7th Edition, Irving Copi, p. 161
vi Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and the Scientific Method, (Harcourt, Brace 
& World, 1934), pp. 223-244
vii Robert Mautz and Hussein Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association, 
1961, pp. 210-211.
viii Mautz and Sharaf, p. 204
ix Barry Melancon
x John Kemeny, A Philospher Looks at Science, (D. Van Nostrand Co, 1959), p.5
Helene_Parent@fee.be
02/15/01 12:53 PM
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To: isb@cpaindependence.org 
cc:
Subject: FEE Ethics Working Party - Comment letter on your Exposure Draft 
ED 00-2: Statement of Independence Concepts ? A Conceptual 
Framework for Auditor Independence
Please see after the commenting letter from the Ethics Working Party of the 
European Federation of Accountants (FEE) on ED 00-2. A formal letter will 
also follow by post.
Best regards,
Helene Parent
FEE Director of Regulatory Affairs
1/4
Brussels, 16 February 2001
Independence Standards Board 
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY
10036-8775
USA
Dear Madam, dear Sir,
Re: Exposure Draft ED 00-2: Statement of Independence Concepts ? A
Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) wrote to you on 6 
June 2000 relating to the Discussion Memorandum you issued on the above 
subject and we are pleased to have the opportunity to submit our comments 
on the Exposure Draft.
We very much welcome the Board's work advocating the use of a conceptual 
framework in the determination of guidance on auditor independence. As we 
explained in more detail in our letter of seven months ago, the use of a 
conceptual approach underpins FEE'S own Common Core of Principles, set out 
in 1998. The International Federation of Accountants and the European 
Commission, in the current drafts of their forthcoming papers on 
independence, have since adopted a similar approach. In an increasingly 
global economy, international harmonisation is an important goal and the 
consideration of the conceptual framework in the context of the U.S. 
auditor independence code will greatly assist in this process.
We set out below some general observations on key aspects of the paper, 
together with some specific comments following up some of our responses to 
the questions posed in the Discussion Memorandum.
General observations
Firstly, we wonder whether the four basic guidelines needed to implement 
the conceptual framework are best described as 'principles'. In our view, 
the principles are the underlying requirements that auditors perform their 
work with objectivity and professional integrity. The conceptual framework 
of assessment of threats and safeguards is a means to achieving those 
principles.
The section of the Exposure Draft on the consideration of costs and 
benefits raises an important question and your paper considers the nature 
of some of the costs and benefits likely to result from auditor 
independence. We entirely agree with the conclusion that costs and 
benefits should be considered: independence cannot be absolute and it is 
reasonable to consider costs and benefits when determining the level of 
independence that is acceptable. In this connection, the concept of 
proportionality should be observed. This concept when applied to law or 
regulation requires that the effect of the law or regulation on the market 
place should be "proportionate" to the objective of protecting the public 
interest. However, the analysis of costs and benefits should not be 
overcomplicated.
Another issue that we believe could usefully be developed further is who 
is best placed to apply the framework. We believe there are merits in 
considering the benefits of placing the responsibility for making the 
decision on whether to undertake the engagement on the auditor alone. This
is considered further below.
In the context of international harmonisation, we suggest that the 
definitions and the terminology should be revisited and adapted so that 
there is as much consistency as possible with the definitions used by IFAC 
in its ED on Independence and the EU in its proposed recommendation on 
statutory auditors' independence. The latter paper can be found at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/audit/news/indintro.htm
Comments on the resolution of certain issues raised in the Discussion
Memorandum (DM 00-1)
Introduction ? Scope and content
FEE is concerned that the conceptual framework is referred to, in 
paragraph 2 and several other contexts, as a tool for resolving 
independence issues "in the absence of ISB standards or other rules", or 
words to that effect. A reader could get the impression that all 
imaginable independence problems should ideally be covered by detailed 
rules, and that the conceptual framework is intended for use only in 
situations where such rules are not (yet) in place. For similar reasons 
FEE is also concerned over the definition of 'independence decision 
maker'. The definition includes individual auditors in assessing their own 
independence and in making decisions 'when faced with situations for which 
there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy'. As FEE noted in 
its response to the Discussion Memorandum, "the use of casuistic 
checklists may foster a mechanical attitude towards compliance with 
independence requirements. Auditors and supervisory bodies may get the 
false impression that if all the detailed prohibitions have been observed, 
independence issues need no more attention." In fact, this weakness of 
detailed rules is indirectly admitted in paragraph 6 of the ED.
In FEE'S opinion the conceptual framework should serve the individual 
auditor as the main tool for resolving all independence issues. In the 
framework approach adopted internationally, the ability to cater for the 
infinite variety of individual circumstances that arise in practice is 
considered to be best served by placing the onus on the auditor actively 
to consider independence issues for each engagement. It goes without 
saying that the auditor must comply with any existing prohibitions, 
whether or not he finds them appropriate in the individual case. Such 
rules, however, should never be regarded as exhaustive. Even in a 
situation that is covered by detailed rules the auditor has to use an 
analytical approach in accordance with the framework model to identify any
threats to independence that are not anticipated by the rules. In such 
circumstances, it must of course be incumbent on the auditor to be able to 
demonstrate that a responsible conclusion has been reached, assisting with 
the quality insurance that is necessary to retain public confidence. The 
regulator should complement the conceptual framework with detailed rules 
only to give guidance on the application of the general principles to 
specific situations, such as prohibitions where no other safeguard would 
be acceptable.
Goal of auditor independence
The Introduction to FEE'S own Common Core of Principles notes that the 
statutory audit was introduced into the legal framework in Europe to 
protect the interests of shareholders and of other stakeholders in 
enterprises and, more generally, the public at large. We support the 
adoption of an outward-looking goal: independence is not an end in itself,
but a means to an end.
Defining auditor independence
We agree that it is appropriate to consider independence of appearance as 
well as independence of mind. The draft European Union document 
Consultative Paper on Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A Set of 
Fundamental Principles, adopting a definition similar to that in the 
Common Core of Principles, considers that independence should address:
° "Independence of mind, i.e. the state of mind which has regard to all 
considerations relevant to the task in hand, but no others; and 
° Independence in appearance, i.e. the avoidance of facts and 
circumstances which are so significant that a reasonable and informed 
third party would question the Statutory Auditor’s ability to act 
objectively."
We are concerned, that your definition will be taken to imply an 
unrealistic degree of absoluteness to independence: a fear that you 
express yourselves in Appendix C.
Basic Principles of Auditor Independence ? Analysing Threats and 
safeguards
In the section concerning the determination of the acceptability of the 
level of the independence risk, it is mentioned in paragraph 26 that 
'independence decision makers should identify the individual or groups 
affected by threats to auditor independence and the significance of those 
threats'. To that end, FEE in its commenting letter on DM-001, categorised 
three groups of individuals in the audit firm whose ability to influence 
the outcome of the audit varies substantially. We consider that it would 
be helpful to introduce a categorisation of this sort into your document.
Basic Principles of Auditor Independence ? Considering Stakeholders' 
Perceptions
In FEE'S response to the Discussion Memorandum, it was observed that 
whilst the importance of stakeholder perceptions is acknowledged, the 
paper did not deal enough with what their perceptions are. We welcome the 
further analysis and definitions of who these stakeholders might be in the 
ED, but regret that no additional comments are made on those perceptions.
Again, we suggest that ISB considers the new and radically different 
paradigms of stakeholder engagement in the emerging fields of social, 
environmental and sustainability reporting.
We would be pleased to be of any assistance to you in respect of this 
project and in particular, any issues raised by this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Dr. Harald Ring
Chairman,
FEE Ethics Working Party
T H E  I N S T I T U T E  O F  I N T E R N A L  A U D I T O R S Professional
Development
William G. Bishop III, CIA
President 1 0
Research
Foundation
Certified
Internal Auditor ®
February 16, 2001
Arthur Siegel, Executive Director 
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Art:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Independence Standards Board’s (ISB) 
Exposure Draft (ED) on Statement o f  Independence Concepts -  A Conceptual 
Framework fo r  Auditor Independence (ED 00-2). The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
supports the development of a conceptual framework for auditor independence that will 
help the ISB issue principles-based independence standards for auditors of public 
companies. Our comments to the questions raised in the exposure draft are as follows:
1. Definition of Auditor Independence
The definition of auditor independence contained in paragraph four may be flawed in 
that ‘freedom from  those pressures ” seems to denote an absolute. The next sentence 
modifies the definition so as not to imply that an auditor must be free from all 
pressures. Paragraph six states that, “an auditor must be able, and be reasonably 
expected to be able, to overcome pressures and other factors that would prevent 
unbiased audit decisions.” Clearly, the document states that the definition of 
independence cannot be the absolute freedom from pressures.
The International Federation o f  Accountants (IFAC) issued a draft revision to their 
Code of Ethics concerning independence. They do not define independence on its 
own (Section 8.3) because the definition can create misunderstandings. Rather they 
state (section 8.2) that the reporting accountant (auditor) must be both independent of 
mind and independent in appearance. They define both as follows:
249 M aitland Avenue
Altam onte Springs, 
Florida 32701-4201
U.S.A.
tel 407 830-7600 
fax 407 831-5171 
email wbishop@theiia.org
• Independent of Mind -  “The state o f mind that permits the provision of an opinion 
without being affected by the influences that impair professional judgment; when 
used in conjunction with the independence required of a reporting accountant 
(auditor), it includes the qualities of integrity, objectivity and professional 
skepticism.
• Independence in Appearance- The ability to demonstrate that risks to 
independence of mind have been eliminated, or limited to such clearly 
insignificant matters, so that an informed third party (investors) would not 
reasonably question the reporting accountant’s objectivity.
We recommend that a format and concept similar to IFAC’s be used in place of the 
definition o f independence exposed by the ISB.
2. Goal of Auditor Independence
We agree that the goals are appropriate.
3. & 4. Concepts and Basic Principles of Auditor Independence
We believe that the concepts and basic principles are appropriate and will provide 
a framework for evaluating auditor independence.
5. Other Issues
We do not believe there are other issues that should be addressed.
Established in 1941, the Institute of Internal Auditors is an international professional 
organization with world headquarters in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The IIA has over 
70,000 members in internal auditing, governance, internal control, IT audit, education 
and security. Many of our members share membership with professional accountancy 
bodies throughout the world. With representation from more than 100 countries, the 
Institute is the acknowledged leader in standards, certification, education, research and 
technological guidance for the profession worldwide.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to provide the Institute's comments on this 
exposure draft. If  the IIA can provide further assistance please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
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February 23, 2001
E-mail: isb@cpaindependence.org
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attention: ED 00-2
Re: Exposure Draft (ED 00-2) Statement of Independence Concepts, A 
Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence (November 2000)
Dear Members and Staff:
We are pleased to submit this letter o f comments on ED 00-2 on behalf o f the 
Committee o f Law and Accounting, Section of Business Law, American Bar 
Association. Our letter was prepared by a drafting group comprised o f members 
of our Committee. Those other members of our Committee who reviewed drafts 
of our letter, which were widely circulated through our Committee’s listserv, were 
in general agreement with our letter. However, our letter does not reflect the 
official views of our Committee, the Section of Business Law or the American 
Bar Association.
Introduction
We agree with the Board’s conceptual goal “to support user reliance on the 
financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency.” We also 
agree that auditor independence is critical to achieving that goal.
Discussion
The Board proposes to define auditor independence as “freedom from those 
pressures and factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to
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Under ED 00-2, “independence risk” is “the risk that threats to auditor 
independence, to the extent that they are not mitigated by safeguards,
compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to 
make unbiased audit decisions”.
We recognize that ED 00-2 is a proposal to establish a conceptual framework for 
auditor independence and we do not disagree with the Board’s approach. 
Nevertheless, we believe that any standards developed within the proposed 
framework must be clear and workable in practice. We address some o f our 
concerns in this regard below.
One aspect of the Board’s approach that troubles us is that it would establish an 
objective standard- “whether well informed investors and other users of financial 
statements would reasonably consider the activities, relationships, or other 
circumstances in question as precluding independence.” However, in practice, this 
standard may be applied subjectively by auditors, in the first instance, and then by 
“independence decision makers”, including audit committee members. We are 
concerned that this could result in greater exposure to audit committee members 
when a tribunal applies an objective standard to an essentially subjective decision. 
If  the audit committee is an independence decision maker, relied upon by 
investors and other users of financial statements to make independence decisions, 
there must be clear and workable criteria that they can apply and may rely on to 
protect them from liability for reasonable judgments made in good faith. 
Accordingly, we urge that any implementing standards provide audit committee 
members with objective criteria to look to in applying this standard.
We also believe that any implementing standards should draw a better line 
between inappropriate advocacy by independent auditors and their appropriate 
support o f a client’s position on accounting matters.
Further, we believe that the threat to independence from an auditor’s desire to 
preserve the audit engagement to earn audit fees, which the Board recognizes, 
should be addressed in any implementing standards.
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make audit decisions”. However, the Board
does not propose that independence or lack of independence in fact be determined.
Rather, the Board proposes a “threats/safeguards” approach, which would require
an assessment of “independence risk” by “independence decision makers”.
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Respectfully submitted,
We thank the Board for the opportunity to submit our comments on ED 00-2.
Members of our Committee would be available if  the Board wishes to discuss our
conclusions and suggestions.
/s/ Richard H. Rowe
Richard H. Rowe
Chair, Committee on law and Accounting
Drafting Group:
Richard H. Rowe 
Dan L. Goldwasser
cc: Dan L. Goldwasser
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bcc: Gwen Quillen
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Dear Madam, dear Sir,
Re: Exposure Draft ED 00-2: Statement o f Independence Concepts -  A Conceptual Framework 
for Auditor Independence
The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) wrote to you on 6 June 2000 relating to 
the Discussion Memorandum you issued on the above subject and we are pleased to have the 
opportunity to submit our comments on the Exposure Draft.
We very much welcome the Board’s work advocating the use of a conceptual framework in the 
determination of guidance on auditor independence. As we explained in more detail in our letter of 
seven months ago, the use of a conceptual approach underpins FEE’s own Common Core of 
Principles, set out in 1998. The International Federation of Accountants and the European 
Commission, in the current drafts of their forthcoming papers on independence, have since 
adopted a similar approach. In an increasingly global economy, international harmonisation is an 
important goal and the consideration of the conceptual framework in the context of the U.S. 
auditor independence code will greatly assist in this process.
We set out below some general observations on key aspects of the paper, together with some 
specific comments following up some of our responses to the questions posed in the Discussion 
Memorandum.
General observations
Firstly, we wonder whether the four basic guidelines needed to implement the conceptual 
framework are best described as ‘principles’. In our view, the principles are the underlying 
requirements that auditors perform their work with objectivity and professional integrity. The 
conceptual framework of assessment of threats and safeguards is a means to achieving those 
principles.
be Association Internationale reconnue par Arrêté Royal en date du 30 décembre 1986
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The section of the Exposure Draft on the consideration of costs and benefits raises an important 
question and your paper considers the nature of some of the costs and benefits likely to result from 
auditor independence. We entirely agree with the conclusion that costs and benefits should be 
considered: independence cannot be absolute and it is reasonable to consider costs and benefits 
when determining the level of independence that is acceptable. In this connection, the concept of 
proportionality should be observed. This concept when applied to law or regulation requires that 
the effect of the law or regulation on the market place should be “proportionate” to the objective of 
protecting the public interest. However, the analysis of costs and benefits should not be 
overcomplicated.
Another issue that we believe could usefully be developed further is who is best placed to apply 
the framework. We believe there are merits in considering the benefits of placing the responsibility 
for making the decision on whether to undertake the engagement on the auditor alone. This is 
considered further below.
In the context of international harmonisation, we suggest that the definitions and the terminology 
should be revisited and adapted so that there is as much consistency as possible with the 
definitions used by IFAC in its ED on Independence and the EU in its proposed recommendation 
on statutory auditors’ independence. The latter paper can be found at:
http://europa.eu. int/comm/internal_market/en/company/audit/news/indintro.htm
Comments on the resolution o f certain issues raised in the Discussion Memorandum (DM 00-1)
Introduction -  Scope and content
FEE is concerned that the conceptual framework is referred to, in paragraph 2 and several other 
contexts, as a tool for resolving independence issues “in the absence of ISB standards or other 
rules”, or words to that effect. A reader could get the impression that all imaginable independence 
problems should ideally be covered by detailed rules, and that the conceptual framework is 
intended for use only in situations where such rules are not (yet) in place. For similar reasons FEE 
is also concerned over the definition of ‘independence decision maker’. The definition includes 
individual auditors in assessing their own independence and in making decisions ‘when faced with 
situations for which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy’. As FEE noted in its 
response to the Discussion Memorandum, “the use of casuistic checklists may foster a mechanical 
attitude towards compliance with independence requirements. Auditors and supervisory bodies 
may get the false impression that if all the detailed prohibitions have been observed, independence
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issues need no more attention.” In fact, this weakness of detailed rules is indirectly admitted in 
paragraph 6 of the ED.
In FEE’S opinion the conceptual framework should serve the individual auditor as the main tool 
for resolving all independence issues. In the framework approach adopted internationally, the 
ability to cater for the infinite variety of individual circumstances that arise in practice is 
considered to be best served by placing the onus on the auditor actively to consider independence 
issues for each engagement. It goes without saying that the auditor must comply with any existing 
prohibitions, whether or not he finds them appropriate in the individual case. Such rules, however, 
should never be regarded as exhaustive. Even in a situation that is covered by detailed rules the 
auditor has to use an analytical approach in accordance with the framework model to identify any 
threats to independence that are not anticipated by the rules. In such circumstances, it must of 
course be incumbent on the auditor to be able to demonstrate that a responsible conclusion has 
been reached, assisting with the quality insurance that is necessary to retain public confidence. The 
regulator should complement the conceptual framework with detailed rules only to give guidance 
on the application of the general principles to specific situations, such as prohibitions where no 
other safeguard would be acceptable.
Goal of auditor independence
The Introduction to FEE’s own Common Core of Principles notes that the statutory audit was 
introduced into the legal framework in Europe to protect the interests of shareholders and of other 
stakeholders in enterprises and, more generally, the public at large. We support the adoption of an 
outward-looking goal: independence is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.
Defining auditor independence
We agree that it is appropriate to consider independence of appearance as well as independence of 
mind. The draft European Union document1, adopting a definition similar to that in the Common 
Core of Principles, considers that independence should address:
° “Independence of mind, i.e. the state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to 
the task in hand, but no others; and
° Independence in appearance, i.e. the avoidance of facts and circumstances which are so 
significant that a reasonable and informed third party would question the Statutory Auditor’s 
ability to act objectively.”
1 Consultative Paper on Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles
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 We are concerned, that your definition will be taken to imply an unrealistic degree of absoluteness 
to independence: a fear that you express yourselves in Appendix C.
Basic Principles of Auditor Independence -  Analysing Threats and safeguards
In the section concerning the determination of the acceptability of the level of the independence
risk, it is mentioned in paragraph 26 that ‘independence decision makers should identify the
individual or groups affected by threats to auditor independence and the significance of those 
threats’. To that end, FEE in its commenting letter on DM-001, categorised three groups of 
individuals in the audit firm whose ability to influence the outcome of the audit varies 
substantially. We consider that it would be helpful to introduce a categorisation of this sort into 
your document.
Basic Principles of Auditor Independence -  Considering Stakeholders’ Perceptions
In FEE’S response to the Discussion Memorandum, it was observed that whilst the importance of 
stakeholder perceptions is acknowledged, the paper did not deal enough with what their 
perceptions are. We welcome the further analysis and definitions of who these stakeholders might 
be in the ED, but regret that no additional comments are made on those perceptions.
Again, we suggest that ISB considers the new and radically different paradigms of stakeholder 
engagement in the emerging fields of social, environmental and sustainability reporting.
We would be pleased to be of any assistance to you in respect of this project and in particular, any 
issues raised by this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Dr Harald Ring 
Chairman
FEE Ethics Working Party
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AICPA
P C PS
February 28, 2001
Susan McGrath, CPA 
Director
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
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Re: Independence Standards Board (ISB) Exposure Draft (ED 00-02) Statement of
Independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
Dear Ms. McGrath:
One of the objectives that the Council of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
established for the PCPS Executive Committee is to act as an advocate for all local and 
regional firms and represent those firms’ interests on professional issues, primarily through the 
Technical Issues Committee (“TIC”). This communication is in accordance with that objective. 
These comments, however, do not necessarily express the positions of the AICPA.
TIC has reviewed the above referenced exposure draft (“ED”) and is providing the following 
comments for your consideration.
Issue 1: DEFINITION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom from 
those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions. ”
TIC agrees with the definition of auditor independence as stated in the ED and is pleased with 
the approach taken to address the “appearance of independence” issue.
Issue 2: GOAL OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal of auditor independence is “to 
support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance capital market 
efficiency. ”
TIC believes the goal of auditor independence is appropriate as stated.
Issue 3: CONCEPTS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Are the concepts and basic principles appropriate and sufficiently operational? If not,
what changes would you suggest, and why?
TIC believes that more specific guidance should be provided regarding the definition of self­
review threats in paragraph 12b. TIC believes that, without further clarification, the scope of
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 • 1 800 CPA FIRM • fax (201) 938-3404
Partnering for CPA Practice Success • The AICPA Alliance for CPA Firms
Susan McGrath, CPA
February 28, 2001
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the definition may be misinterpreted. Paragraph 12b currently defines self-review threats as 
“threats that arise from auditors reviewing their own work or the work done by others in their 
firm.” TIC identified two possible interpretations of the definition:
1. an auditor’s review of the working papers prepared by staff or contract employees for an 
audit engagement (a quality control issue)
2. an auditor’s review of the work of others in his/her own firm that have performed nonaudit 
services for a client (an independence issue).
TIC understands the ISB’s intention was to limit the definition of self-review threats to the 
independence context only. To avoid additional confusion, TIC recommends, at a minimum, 
that clarifying language be substituted for the word “work” and that examples be given to 
illustrate the scope of the definition.
Other Issues: APPLICABILITY OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
TIC noted that the scope paragraph from the conceptual framework DM 00-1, paragraph 2, 
seems to have been omitted entirely from the ED. TIC believes that the Statement of 
Independence Concepts should include a scope paragraph to state the applicability of the 
conceptual framework. TIC understands that the ISB’s mandate is to set standards for auditors 
who are required to meet SEC independence requirements. However, since TIC believes that 
there should be no conceptual differences between audits of public and private firms, TIC 
recommends the inclusion of a scope paragraph that encourages all firms to adopt the 
Statement o f Independence Concepts -  A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence.
TIC appreciates the opportunity to present these comments on behalf of PCPS member firms. 
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,
Candace Wright, Chair
PCPS Technical Issues Committee
cc: PCPS Executive and Technical Issues Committees
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STATEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE
Exposure Draft ED 00-2 issued by the Independence Standards Board
Comments from the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
February 2001
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ACCA is the largest global professional accountancy body, with 
250,000 members and students in 160 countries. ACCA's headquarters 
are in London and it has 28 staffed offices around the world. The 
ACCA syllabus has been recognised by the United Nations as 
providing the basis for a global accountancy qualification. ACCA's 
mission is to provide quality professional opportunities to people of 
ability and application, to be a leader in the development of the 
global accountancy profession, to promote the highest ethical and 
governance standards and to work in the public interest.
Further information on ACCA is available on ACCA's website, 
www.accaglobal.com.
Page 2
Executive Summary
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) is 
pleased to have the opportunity to comment on Exposure Draft ED 
00-2 Statement Of Independence Concepts A Conceptual 
Framework For Auditor Independence (the proposed Statement) 
issued by the Independence Standards Board (ISB).
ACCA welcomes the proposed Statement as it embodies a 
framework approach to independence. This consideration of threats 
and safeguards is inherently superior to a rules based approach and is 
supported by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the 
European Union, ACCA and many other professional bodies.
In our view, the most important step which can be taken to serve the 
public interest and protect and promote investors’ confidence in 
securities markets is the adoption of an appropriate approach to 
auditor independence which is consistent worldwide. In order to 
achieve this, we consider that it is imperative that ISB repositions the 
proposed Statement and its extant Standards to align with the 
relevant aspects of the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (the IFAC Code of Ethics).
Page 3
1 General Comments
Status of the Independence Standards Board
1.1 With the exception of the proposed Statement, ISB has deferred 
development of its pronouncements. We understand that this 
action has been taken as a result of the separate decision of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to modernise its 
auditor independence requirements (Rule 2-01). We assume, 
therefore, that ISB and its stakeholders will reconsider its mission 
in the light of these circumstances. In this regard, we would like 
to highlight the following structural matters.
1.2 Historically, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) has acted as both professional body and 
standard setter. To an extent, for public companies, the SEC 
has acted as both a regulator and a standard setter. We 
suggest that ISB has not been able fully to establish itself as an 
independent standard setter because:
• ISB is concerned with independence rather than the whole 
range of professional ethics
• ISB is concerned only with auditors of public companies
and
• ISB is not independent of the profession (there is no majority 
of lay members on its Board).
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Consistent worldwide approach to independence
1.3 The IFAC Ethics Committee is currently developing revised 
material for the independence aspects of the IFAC Code of 
Ethics. We strongly suggest that the proposed Statement should 
be aligned with that material since, when it is finalised, it will 
have worldwide authoritative status.
1.4 The principal advantages of aligning the proposed Statement 
to the finalised IFAC Code of Ethics are that:
• a consistent worldwide approach to auditor 
independence will best serve the public interest and 
protect and promote investors’ confidence in securities 
markets
• benchmarking of US requirements to best international 
standards will protect and promote US investor confidence
• there is greater likelihood of auditor compliance with US 
independence requirements when these are familiar 
because they are equivalent to requirements in other 
jurisdictions (for example, where an overseas subsidiary of a 
US corporation has local auditors)
and
• compliance with US independence requirements may be 
enforced through accountancy bodies which promulgate 
the IFAC Code of Ethics and which have the power to 
discipline members in all jurisdictions.
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Effect on the proposed Statement of the mission of the 
Independence Standards Board
1.5 The foreword to the proposed Statement notes that:
The mission of the independence Standards Board (ISB or Board) 
is to establish independence standards applicable to the audits 
of public entities in order to serve the public interest and to 
protect and promote investors’ confidence in the securities 
markets. One of the Board’s most fundamental projects since its 
establishment has been the development of a conceptual 
framework for auditor independence to help the Board issue 
principles-based independence standards for auditors of public 
companies.
1.6 The mission and the proposed Statement may be contrasted 
with the pronouncements (and proposed pronouncements) of 
other bodies dealing with professional ethics. Because of its 
importance, we restrict our comparative analysis to differences 
between the proposed Statement and the IFAC Code of Ethics.
1.7 In two respects, the proposed Statement may be seen to have 
a narrower focus than the IFAC Exposure Draft ‘Independence 
Proposed Changes to the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants’ (the proposed IFAC Ethics Code):
• the proposed Statement focuses on audits, whereas the 
proposed IFAC Ethics Code deals with assurance 
engagements which are wider in their application (as 
defined in International Standard on Auditing 100 
‘Assurance Engagements’)
and
• the proposed Statement focuses on the audit of public 
entities, whereas the proposed IFAC Ethics Code is
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applicable to public and non-public entities alike.
1.8 In our comments at paragraph 1.2 above, we drew attention to 
the effect that this narrow focus could have on the ability of ISB 
fully to establish itself as an independent standard setter.
1.9 In one significant regard, however, the proposed Statement is 
much less clearly focused than the proposed IFAC Ethics Code. 
The objective of the proposed IFAC Ethics Code is to assist 
reporting accountants in decision making with regard to 
independence. The proposed Statement explains, however, 
that its principal purposes are:
a. to help the Independence Standards Board (ISB or Board) 
meet its responsibilities to set sound and consistent 
standards by providing direction and structure for resolving 
independence issues
b. to assist other independence decision makers in resolving 
questions about independence in the absence of ISB 
standards and other independence rules
c. to help investors, other users of financial information, and 
other interested parties understand the nature, 
significance, and limitations of auditor independence
and
d. to focus debate and serve as a boundary for discussions 
about auditor independence issues, thereby helping 
interested parties contribute to the development and 
application of, and better understand the rationale and 
process underlying, ISB standards.
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1.10 The term ‘independence decision makers’ is defined in the 
Glossary as follows:
‘Individuals, groups, and entities that make judgments about 
auditor independence issues. Independence decision makers 
include:
- the ISB and other independence standard setters
- auditing firms in adopting independence policies and 
procedures in the absence of existing rules or standards
- individual auditors in assessing their own independence 
and in making decisions when faced with situations for 
which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy
- the management, audit committees, and boards of 
directors of auditees in meeting their responsibilities to 
retain auditors who ore independent
- regulators in meeting their responsibilities to ensure the 
independence of auditors.’
1.11 This wide focus has devalued the document by making it less 
directly relevant to auditors. For example, the discussion of 
assessing the level of independence risk and determining its 
acceptability (paragraphs 22 to 26) should be of the utmost 
practical importance to auditors. However, the discussion is 
highly theoretical and hedged with modifying words. The table 
at paragraph 23, which is not used in the succeeding argument, 
describes a level of independence risk as ‘no independence 
risk’ and then suggests only that ‘compromised objectivity is 
virtually impossible' (emphasis added).
1.12 By contrast, the IFAC Code of Ethics deals with practical 
decision points in an assessment: threats are either ‘clearly 
insignificant’ or safeguards must be considered, safeguards 
must be put in place to reduce significant threats to an 
‘acceptable level', but some threats are so significant that no 
safeguard is appropriate except refusal of the engagement.
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1.13 We see no easy solution to the conflict between the desire of ISB 
to produce a conceptual framework for auditor independence 
to inform a wide spectrum of independence decision makers 
and the needs of firms and auditors when faced with situations 
for which there are no existing rules, standards or guidance. We 
believe that it places too great a demand on the proposed 
Statement fully to fulfil these principal purposes. We 
recommend, therefore, that the proposed Statement is 
addressed only to independence decision makers other than 
auditors. The practical needs of firms and auditors would be 
best met by ISB adopting and promulgating the IFAC Code of 
Ethics. To do this, it is necessary to align the terminology and 
concepts in the proposed Statement with those in the IFAC 
Code of Efhics.
Independence standards
1.14 In our comments above, we have argued that the proposed 
Statement should be aligned with the IFAC Code of Ethics first, 
to promote global consistency and, secondly, as a necessary 
consequence of its use to meet the practical needs of auditors. 
The IFAC Code of Ethics is intended to serve as the only 
mandatory pronouncement for independence: there are no 
separate ‘standards'. This is in contrast to the ISB regime, where 
the Conceptual Framework does not itself establish rules.
1.15 We recognise that in the US environment greater emphasis is 
placed on rules and standards than is now the case in many 
other developed economies. Accordingly, we hesitate to 
suggest that ISB withdraws its extant Standards. It may be 
possible to continue to issue pronouncements as Standards 
which are, to all intents and purposes, the same as the analysis 
of specific situations in the IFAC Code of Ethics.
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2 Comments on Specific 
Questions
Our comments on the specific questions set out in the preface 
to the proposed Statement are given below:
Definition of auditor independence 
The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor 
independence as ‘freedom from those pressures and other 
factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit 
decisions.’ The definition and the basis for the Board’s 
conclusions are discussed in paragraphs 3-7 and 37-46. The 
other components of the conceptual framework are intended to 
help independence decision makers apply the definition to a 
wide variety of auditor independence issues. Is the definition 
appropriate? If not, what changes would you suggest, and 
why?
2.1 We suggest that the definition is made the same as that in the
IFAC Code of Ethics when finalised. The proposed IFAC Code of 
Ethics draws attention to the danger of using the word 
‘independence’ on its own as that may lead to an unrealistic 
expectation that there is some state of absolute independence.
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Goal of auditor independence
The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal of 
auditor independence is “to support user reliance on the 
financial reporting process and to enhance capital market 
efficiency.” The goal and the basis for the Board’s conclusions 
are discussed in paragraphs 8-9 and 47-48. Is the goal 
appropriate? If not what changes would you suggest and 
why?
2.2 A conceptual framework for financial reporting necessarily 
addresses the purpose of financial statements. It is only by 
establishing the purpose of such reports that a suitable frame of 
reference can be created to allow accounting standards 
consistent with it to determine an appropriate form and content 
for reporting. The purpose of independence is, however, bound 
up with the purpose of auditing which is in turn bound up with 
the purpose of financial reporting. The proposed Statement 
suggests that the goal of independence is ‘to support user 
reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance 
capital market efficiency.’ This goal could equally apply to 
auditing itself and, arguably, to the issue of financial statements.
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Concepts and basic principles of auditor independence 
The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles 
related to four concepts of auditor independence: threats, 
safeguards, independence risk, and significance of 
threats/effectiveness of safeguards. The concepts, basic 
principles, and the basis for the Board’s conclusions are 
discussed in paragraphs 10-32 and 49-60. The concepts and 
basic principles contained in the proposed framework are 
intended to serve as guidelines for independence decision 
makers to analyze and resolve independence issues. Are the 
concepts and basic principles appropriate and sufficiently 
operational? If not, what changes would you suggest, and 
why?
2.3 We consider the four concepts in the proposed Statement to be 
valid. However, while there is an obvious need for the concepts 
of threat and safeguard, we consider independence risk and 
the significance of threats/effectiveness of safeguards to be 
derived concepts and to be of little practical worth over and 
above their natural descriptive language. Threats and 
safeguards are important classes of objects and are worthy of 
enumeration. The other two concepts are not necessary. A 
semantic argument could be advanced that ‘independence 
risk' is equivalent to ‘independence threat’ and so presenting 
the two as separate invites confusion. The IFAC Code of Ethics 
deals only with ‘risks to independence’ and ‘safeguards'.
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Paragraphs 49-53 describe the elements of a risk model for 
auditor independence in which independence risk is a function 
of the significance of threats to auditor independence and the 
effectiveness of safeguards to auditor independence. What are 
your views on the appropriateness of the independence risk 
model? Is there research that the Board should be made aware 
of that would be helpful in expanding the model or otherwise 
making it more useful for independence decision makers? If so, 
please describe that research.
2.4 We support ISB’s view (expressed in paragraph 52) that it is 
appropriate to think in terms of independence risk rather than in 
terms of the existence or non-existence of independence. 
However, we are concerned by the statement at paragraph 49 
that ‘An auditor is independent when independence risk is at an 
acceptably low level, as determined by a particular 
independence decision maker’. This raises the prospect of 
decision makers disagreeing as to whether an auditor is 
independent only because they have differing viewpoints.
2.5 The proposed IFAC Code of Ethics focuses on the judgement of a 
reporting accountant and utilises terminology to draw attention 
to certain levels of independence risk:
• Risks are clearly insignificant
• The effect of risks and safeguards together fall below a level 
which would make acceptance or continuation of an 
engagement appropriate (ie. The risk to independence is at 
an acceptable level)
and
• There are insufficient safeguards to reduce risks below the 
level which would allow acceptance or continuation of an 
engagement such that refusal is necessary (refusal is seen as
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a safeguard).
2.6 We have not carried out or commissioned research which would 
be helpful in expanding the model or otherwise making it more 
useful for independence decision makers.
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
29 Lincoln’s Inn Fields London WC2A 3EE United Kingdom 
tel: +44 (0)20 7396 7000 fax: +44 (0)20 7396 7070 
www.accaglobal.com
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College o f  Business Administration 
The University o f  Georgia 
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Von Allmen School o f  Accountancy 
Gatton College o f  Business and Economics 
The University o f  Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0034
February 14, 2001
Reference: ED 00-2
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor, 1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Gentlemen:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Exposure Draft 00-2, “A Conceptual 
Framework for Auditor Independence. We believe the framework offers a useful beginning 
structure for understanding independence risk. However, many of the concepts in the 
framework are ill defined. More importantly, there is little linkage between threats and 
safeguards, and no attempt to understand exactly how they affect auditors’ independence. We 
believe The Independence Standards Board (ISB) should develop a broader model that will 
demonstrate how these factors interrelate and how they affect auditors.
The ISB’s list of threats and safeguards related to independence risk is illustrated in 
Figure One. The Exposure Draft does not explain in any detail how the factors listed 
affect auditors to increase or decrease independence risk. As the Conceptual 
Framework is to be used:
a. to help the Independence Standards Board (ISB or Board) meet its 
responsibilities to set sound and consistent standards by providing 
direction and structure for resolving independence issues;
b. to assist other independence decision makers1 in resolving questions 
about independence in the absence of ISB standards and other 
independence rules;
c. to help investors, other users o f financial information, and other 
interested parties understand the nature, significance, and 
limitations of auditor independence; and
d. to focus debate and serve as a boundary for discussions about auditor 
independence issues, thereby helping interested parties contribute to
1 Words and phrases defined in the Glossary are set in italic type the first time they are used 
in the Statement.
the development and application of, and better understand the rationale 
and process underlying, ISB standards. (ISB 2000, paragraph 1),
we believe that providing a clearer understanding of the attributes underlying the threats and 
safeguards and causally linking them to independent risk is critical to the success of the 
Conceptual Framework. The Conceptual Framework continues:
The significance of a specific threat depends on many factors, including 
the nature of the activity, relationship, or other circumstance creating the 
threat; the force with which pressure is exerted or felt; the importance of 
the matter that is the subject of the activity, relationship, or other 
circumstance; the position and level o f the of responsibility o f the persons 
involved; and the strength of the integrity o f the persons involved. 
Independence decision makers should evaluate these and other factors 
when assessing the threats to auditor independence posed by various 
activities, relationships, and other circumstances. (ISB 2000, paragraph 
19)
The Exposure Draft makes a similar statement for safeguards. If financial statement users and 
corporate board members are to properly evaluate auditors’ independence, they must have an 
understanding of how various threats and safeguards affect that risk. This understanding also 
includes an appreciation of the role of moderating elements such as training, professional 
identity, and personal ethics. Individual auditors also need this understanding in assessing 
their own independence and in making audit decisions when, for example, there is no 
authoritative guidance.
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Figure One
Conceptual Framework Independence Model
Personal 
Qualities 
e.g., integrity
Threats to
Independence
•self-interest
•self-review
•advocacy
•familiarity
•intimidation
Independence Risk
Outcome
Safeguards for 
Independence 
•the environmenta 
•the auditing firmb
aEnvironment:
•reputations
•peer review
•corporate governance e.g., audit committees 
•standards, rules and disciplinary actions 
•legal liability
Accounting firm:
•tone at the top
•professional environment and culture 
•quality assurance programs 
•other policies and practices 
•personnel policies
Researchers have approached independence from a number of disciplines, including 
Economics (e.g. DeAngelo 1981, Simunic 1984, Antle 1984), Psychology (e.g. Bazerman, et 
al 1997), and Ethics (e.g. Sweeney and Roberts 1997). However, there has been little attempt 
to provide a comprehensive model linking the findings and implications from these 
disciplines. In order for users and decision makers to understand and evaluate independence 
risk, they must understand the underlying causes of the threats and safeguards proposed by the 
conceptual framework. Some studies have integrated theories from more than one discipline, 
such as economics and psychology (e.g. King 2001), organizational behavior and economics 
(e.g. Farmer et. al 1987), and ethics and economics (e.g. Koford and Penno 1992). However, 
no one, to our knowledge, has attempted to develop a comprehensive theoretical model from 
which to understand linkages between threats and safeguards in evaluating independence risk. 
The ISB’s Conceptual Framework provides a starting point for undertaking this endeavor.
A useful framework to begin integration and model development comes from Jones (1991). 
As illustrated in Figure Two, Jones starts with four stages of moral decision making developed 
by Rest (1986). Jones adds moral intensity, which consists of magnitude of consequences, 
probability of effect, temporal immediacy, social consensus, proximity, and concentration of 
effect. Jones also includes organizational effects such as group dynamics, organizational 
authority, and socialization processes.
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Figure Two
Jones (1991) Ethical Decision Making Model
Moral Intensity
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Many of the concepts and factors from the Exposure Draft’s Conceptual Framework can be 
mapped into this framework with little difficulty. For example, self-interest, self-review, 
advocacy, and familiarity are elements of moral intensity. Intimidation may be an 
organizational factor or an element of moral intensity. Environmental factors such as 
reputation, peer review, corporate governance, standards and legal liability are organizational 
factors, as are firm related factors.
The elements in the Exposure Draft’s Conceptual Framework are provided on a piecemeal 
basis. The Jones model illustrates how the factors can begin to be linked together. A more 
thorough review of literature, obtaining descriptive data, and empirical testing of hypotheses is 
necessary for a complete model containing all-important factors. For example, Bazerman, et 
al. (1997) show that economic self-interest can subconsciously bias auditors toward their 
clients. However, King’s (2001) results suggest that conscious factors like group 
identification can mitigate self-interest threats. Until we understand such linkages between 
conscious and subconscious threats and safeguards in a decision-making framework, it will be 
difficult for independence decision makers to make proper assessments of independence risk.
Threats can be categorized according to client type, the nature of the activity and its 
importance, the position and level of responsibility of persons involved. Another important 
part of the model will be the role of auditors’ personal qualities and individual characteristics
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as sources of bias in independence risk assessment. Finally, the model should consider how 
independence decision makers weigh and combine critical factors in their independence risk 
assessments and how personal qualities, such as professional identification and integrity, 
modify these relationships and help to determine independence risk.
In sum, we believe the Board should develop a causal model that (1) identifies the primary 
factors that influence the significance of threats to independence and the effectiveness of 
mitigating safeguards, and (2) describes how these threats and safeguards combine and 
interact to determine inherent risk. This model should provide a useful template to help 
independence decision makers make independence risk assessments, gain insight into their 
own independence risk assessments and into the independence risk assessments of others. 
Based on existing research, we believe the Board should also accumulate evidence on the 
importance of personal qualities and characteristics in independence risk. The suggested 
model will also provide a framework for identifying and understanding differences in inherent 
risk assessments between different types of independence decision makers.
Sincerely,
E. Michael Bamber, Ph. D. Robert J. Ramsay, Ph. D., CPA
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To: Independence Standards Board
From: David Dufendach
Re: Statement of Independence Concepts
Exposure Draft ED 00-2
This memorandum will address the specific issues listed on pp. iii and iv of the Exposure 
Draft.
1. Definition of Auditor Independence
No comments -  definition appears appropriate.
2. Goal of Auditor Independence
This is absolutely the right focus. This goal is also very consistent with Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts #1, which focuses on the needs o f third-party investors as 
the primary goal of financial reporting.
3 & 4. Concepts and Basic Principles of Auditor Independence
Paragraph 23 presents a continuum of independence risk (“IR”), including the terms “no 
IR,” “remote IR,” and “some IR.” Paragraph 25 then states that only a “very low level” 
of IR would be acceptable. To make these concepts operational, should the definitions be 
more consistent? For example, should the document state that “only a remote level of 
IR” would be acceptable? Or, should paragraph 23 be expanded/modified to incorporate 
a definition of “very low level” consistent with the guidance of paragraph 25?
Regarding the discussion o f benefits and costs, I generally agree with the rationale 
concerning “second-order effects” that appears in paragraph 29. However, I am also 
familiar with anecdotal evidence (from the business media) that suggests that the 
experience and knowledge gained from the provision of non-audit activities is often not 
communicated to auditors in ways that facilitate audit quality. For these second-order 
effects to truly represent a “cost,” our profession must do a better job of realizing and 
demonstrating the benefits that inhere in the provision of non-audit services. Is this topic 
an appropriate one to address in this ED? If  not ultimately addressed, the issue of 
whether or not non-audit services should be provided by audit firms will likely surface 
again and again.
5. Other Issues
In general, this ED provides little specific guidance regarding non-audit services. Should 
the topic be addressed more explicitly?
Commentary
Exposure Draft
Statement of Independence Concepts
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
This commentary is in response to the exposure draft (above referenced) and the 
supporting article in the Journal of Accountancy (February 2001). It follows the order of 
the “Questions for Respondents” in the exposure draft which are not necessarily in order 
of importance to this author.
1.) Definition of Auditor Independence
The ‘publications’ stress the auditors and audit teams and the pressures or factors that 
compromise ... “an ability to make unbiased decisions.” Further, we now have 
“independence decision makers,” presumably practice units (firms or parts o f firms) 
which will have the final responsibility for determining violations o f or threats to 
independence.
What has happened to the “appearance of independence.” In my forty-five years o f 
practice, this was the beacon—the guiding light of independence concepts—now 
disappeared without even a good-bye. It used to be a given, that CPAs would not accept 
engagements or assignments where they could not function with objectivity, integrity, 
and independence. Rather, as a profession, we imposed the additional burden on 
ourselves of appearance— how would the business community and the public see the 
matter. We were unbending in the matter o f appearance, even though our members 
incurred economic cost to respect this concept. Has economics now become the beacon?
2.) Goal o f Auditor Independence
The publications suggest that the goal of auditor independence is to “support user 
reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency.”
This is a very narrow definition. What about the image o f the profession to the public? 
What about the respect afforded to CPA’s in the 1001 services they provide clients 
outside o f the attest function and financial statements.
Even applying the ‘narrow’ definition to our goal raises serious questions. Does the use 
of “independence decision makers” support reliance and enhance efficiency? Can the fox 
be trusted to design the chicken coop? ... and even if  we believe it can be trusted, how 
does it look? Worse, how does it look if  a chicken(s) is (are) missing?
3. & 4.) Concepts and Basic Principles of Auditor Independence
Everyone who has some years in public practices is familiar with “independence risk.” It 
is as natural to the public accountant’s work as transpositions. Further, every firm has 
imposed safeguards— and these safeguards stem from and revolve around Rule 101 o f the
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Code o f Professional Conduct. Now it appears we are discarding Rule 101 and 
suggesting that independence decision makers can assess an “acceptable level” of 
independence risk and modify it by steps taken as they see fit.
At the least, it seems the profession should mandate that such decisions put the burden on 
the independence decision makers to support an avoidance o f Rule 101 (or its ISB 
successor) just as we require an auditor who makes a decision in conflict with published 
standards to support his variation or be found in violation o f Rule 202.
Also, we are saying a basic principle of independence is a cost benefit rule. Thus, 
between an acceptable level o f independence risk and the evaluation o f cost vs. benefit o f 
independence, we have achieved the concept of “just a little bit pregnant” as a measure 
for independence compliance.
Finally, these matters are summarized in a conceptual framework. Conspicuous by its 
absence is the indication that the ISB will provide a skeleton, a framework, and some 
consistency to the independence concept between and among the practice units. Thus, 
each individual or organization is free to assess, evaluate, and modify (rationalize) 
independence risks for the practice unit in free form. (Yes, Virginia, the public 
accounting profession really cares about independence.)
5.) Other Issues
The timing o f this change so soon after the news was full o f ‘Big 5’ violations of 
independence rules should be considered. Instead o f disciplining the firms and their 
member violators, we give a perception o f changing the rules so the acts in questions are 
no longer violations. This is too much too fast.
The relaxation o f ownership rules for large firms with ‘publicly traded’ clients is asking 
for trouble. Imagine a client that has a terrific year with a corresponding stock value 
increase. Now the news is that a number o f (non-engagement team) firm members 
purchased stock during the year. Could that be insider information? Can you stop a 
firm’s jungle drums/grapevine? How will the press or SEC handle this and what happens 
to the rest o f the profession?
The relaxation or elimination o f family relationship rule(s) has great appeal. My heart 
goes out to the husband and wife example in the Journal o f Accountancy article. 
However, I suspect that the frequency o f occurrence o f this example is next to nil. 
Imagine what will happen if  there is a client bankruptcy or alleged financial impropriety. 
It is a given that H&W are innocent, but does that deter the p laintiffs attorney or press?
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6.) Conclusion
Rule 101 has been in effect for some fifty years. It has helped to polish the professions 
reputation amongst the business and financial communities and helped to earn one of the 
“most respected professions” from the public at large.
Suddenly, we have the papers full o f ‘Big 5’ violations and a new ISB which must feel 
pressured to “do something”. Can it be right to cancel Rule 101 (which is admittedly 
burdensome) and transfer the ethics administration to the firms/practice units by creation 
of the concept of “independence decision makers” as the arbiters for independence 
questions? I don’t think so. At the least, such a change should come in small steps or 
increments. Let us see how the change works by assigning one o f the Sections o f 101 to 
the firms and monitoring the results. Then, if  satisfied, we can incrementally add to the 
firms responsibilities. If  it doesn’t, we can go back to what brung us.
Paul Goldberg  
Member Ethics Committee 
Illinois CPA Society
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THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST
Date: February 28, 2001 OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
To: Art Siegel
From: Dennis Spackman
Subject: Response to ED 00-2
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft, ED 00-2, Statement o f Independence 
Concepts; A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence.
I would like to express my appreciation for the excellent support you and your staff provided the 
development of this exposure draft, and to professors Jaenicke, Glazer and Clarkson for their 
exceptional support as well.
I also appreciate the extended period for comments. It has given me time to focus on both the content 
and relationships of the various elements of the framework.
Please find attached, my response to the questions asked in the ED and other observations I made 
during my reading of it. I hope you find them helpful.
Best regards always,
Dennis
Dennis Paul Spackman
50 East North Temple, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84150-3643
Phone: 801-240-1280
Fax: 801-240-1121
E-mail: SpackmanDP@ldschurch.org 
or DPSpackman@worldnet.att.net
Statement of Independence Concepts:
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
Response to ED 00-2
Dennis Paul Spackman, CPA February 28, 2001
My comments concerning the Exposure Draft, A conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence follow:
Question on Definition of Auditor Independence: Is the definition appropriate? I f  not, what changes 
would you suggest, and why?
After careful consideration I find the definition to be effective. The discussion around the definition is very 
good. It places the definition in a relevant context that makes it operational.
There is however, one factor missing from the discussion and that is the importance of the role of 
management, boards and directors and audit committees. I believe the ED could give more attention to the 
responsibilities of management, boards of directors and audit committees for the development of sound 
financial information and maintenance of auditor/audit firm independence. The conceptual framework would 
benefit for instance, from the inclusion of some of the relevant thinking and beneficial efforts of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees and, the ISB’s efforts on 
these same matters.
I also suggest the following change be made in paragraph #7, item “b”: “ . . .  factors - defined in this 
Statement as safeguards, restrictions and prohibitions to auditor independence;” I make this suggestion 
because I believe the ED gives to much focus to the word “safeguards”. I suggest a broader perspective be 
adopted such as “Safeguards, Restrictions and Prohibitions.” This broader perspective recognizes the fact 
that standard setters have and will continue to set restrictions and prohibitions for particular activities, 
relationships and circumstances, not just “safeguards.” Tucking restrictions and prohibitions under the broad 
umbrella of “safeguards” may be conceptually correct but it may also be a strategic error.
Question on Goal o f Auditor Independence: Is the goal appropriate? I f  not, what changes would you 
suggest, and why?
I like the simplicity and clarity of the definition but it may have a weakness. The definition doesn’t explain 
how or why auditor independence and the users’ perceptions of the auditor’s independence establish user 
reliance. Missing also are the concepts of credibility and confidence. This problem could be overcome if the 
goal statement was broadened to tie more effectively to the two key elements of the goal of independence, 
enhancing capital market efficiency and, user reliance and confidence on the financial reporting process. I 
believe the goal would be strengthened with this modification. The narrative discussion following the goal 
covers these matters. Couldn’t these concepts be incorporated into the wording of the goal itself?
Question on Concepts and Basic Principles o f Auditor Independence: Are the concepts and basic 
principles appropriate and sufficiently operational? I f  not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
I am troubled with the Concepts and Principles paragraphs of the ED. After some consideration I’ve 
concluded the ED probably doesn’t have solid principles statements, principles that are statements of basic 
truths or standards. Instead, it presents a set of four concepts that are pretty solid and would probably better 
serve as principles and, four principles whose nature and application is instead more advisory.
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After some consideration, I believe there are perhaps only three basic principles:
Principle #1; Threats to auditor independence, independence risk: (Paragraphs #18, and #10 through #12)
An auditor’s ability to make unbiased decisions can be compromised if threats to the auditor’s independence 
are not mitigated.
Threats to auditor independence that may compromise, or may reasonably be expected to compromise, an 
auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions include:
• Self interest threats
• Self-review threats
• Advocacy threats
• Familiarity (or trust) threats
• Intimidation threats
(I suggest the four guiding principles of the SEC’s revised independence requirements: 1) has a mutual or 
conflicting interest with the audit client, 2) audits his or her own firm’s work, 3) functions as management or 
an employee of the audit client, and 4) acts as an advocate for the audit client, be incorporated into and made 
part of this principle.)
Principle #2: Significance of threats to auditor independence: (Paragraph #19)
The significance of a threat to auditor independence is the extent to which the threat increases independence 
risk. Significance depends on many factors including the nature of the activity, relationship, or other 
circumstance creating the threat including:
• Force of pressure exerted
• Importance of the matter relative to -  activity, relationship or circumstance
• Position and level of responsibility of person involved
• Strength and integrity of person involved
Principle #3: Safeguards, Restrictions and Prohibitions: (Paragraph #13)
Safeguards, restrictions and prohibitions may be used to mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence. 
Concepts/Guidance -  Safeguards, Restrictions and Prohibitions: (Paragraphs #14a through #17 and #20)
The paragraphs of the ED cited discusses various means of mediating risks to auditor independence. They 
give important guidance, but I don’t believe they operate at the same level, as do principles.
I suggest the subject matter of these paragraphs be presented in the following order:
Reference order and subject stem:
#15 Another way of describing safeguards is by their nature:
#16 A third way in which safeguards can be described . . . .
#20 The effectiveness of a safeguard to auditor independence is . . . .
#14/a Safeguards exist in the environment. . .
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#14b Safeguards that exist within auditing firms . . . .
#17 Safeguards may work either singly or in combination . . . .
The material discussed in the above referenced paragraphs is important and does warrant separate treatment. 
However, as noted previously, I believe the EDs focus on the word “safeguards” is a mistake. A broader 
context should be adopted. One that gives recognition to the fact that standard setters have and will continue 
to set restrictions and prohibitions for particular activities, relationships and circumstances.
I would also like to see more attention given to the responsibilities of management, boards of directors and 
audit committees for developing sound financial information and the independence of the auditor/audit firm 
than is currently given in paragraph 14a.
Relevant information contained in paragraphs #22 - #32 should be incorporated into this section of the ED.
What are your views on the appropriateness o f the independence risk model? Is there research that the 
Board should be made aware o f that would be helpful in expanding the model or otherwise making it more 
useful for independent decision makers? I f  so, please describe that research.
I believe the risk model is sound and the profession’s experience with it has substantiated its viability.
Question on Other Issues: Are there other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual framework that 
the Board should consider? I f  so, what are those issues, and how would you advise the Board to resolve 
them?
I do not have any other issues.
I hope you find these comments helpful. Should you have any questions or want to discuss them with me, 
please feel free to call.
Best regards always,
Dennis
Dennis Paul Spackman
50 East North Temple, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84150-3643
Phone: 801-240-1280
Fax: 801-240-1121
E-mail: SpackmanDP@ldschurch.org 
or DPSpackman@worldnet.att.net
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February 28, 2001
Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Art:
I have read the Exposure Draft of ED 00-2 entitled Statement o f  Independence Concepts 
A Conceptual Framework fo r  Auditor Independence. I believe that the ISB (Board) has 
developed a reasonably complete list o f threats to auditor independence, and I support the 
safeguards approach to addressing identified threats.
I am responding as an individual, and my comments do not necessarily represent the 
views of the Auditing Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association’s 
Auditing Section.
I hope all is well with you.
Best regards,
Joseph V. Carcello
Stokely Scholar and Associate Professor
COMMENTS ON “STATEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE” 
(EXPOSURE DRAFT NO. ED 00-2)
Comments of Joseph V. Carcello, Ph.D., CPA, CMA, CIA 
Stokely Scholar and Associate Professor 
University of Tennessee
I believe that the ISB (Board) has developed a reasonably complete list o f threats to 
auditor independence, and I support the safeguards approach to addressing identified 
threats.
Major Concerns
Paragraph .12. ED 00-2 identifies five threats to auditor independence -  self-interest 
threats, self-review threats, advocacy threats, familiarity (or trust) threats, and 
intimidation threats. I believe that some o f these threats are exacerbated by pressures 
imposed by the firm. For example, the auditor may face: (1) penalties for losing a client, 
(2) demands to bring in new business, (3) cost of technical consultations being charged to 
the job thus hurting realization rates, etc. I suggest that the Board explicitly recognize 
these firm pressures, and recognize the pernicious effects that such firm pressures can 
have when they interact with the five threats to auditor independence identified in the 
document. This issue is particularly problematic since ED 00-2 identifies the firm as a 
primary party responsible for implementing safeguards to address threats to auditor 
independence. The Board should not lose sight of the fact that, in some cases, the firm 
and/or its representatives can be a non-trivial part o f the problem.
Paragraph .12, e. In discussing intimidation threats, I encourage the Board to consider 
adding a statement that an auditor is not independent if  the client fails to comply with the 
new audit committee rule whereby the auditor is to view the board o f directors and the 
audit committee as the client. If  client management cannot terminate the auditor without 
the audit committee’s consent, management’s ability to intimidate the auditor has been 
reduced (assuming a properly functioning audit committee). Explicitly stating that the 
auditor is not independent if  the client fails to act in accordance with this new audit 
committee rule may give these new rules additional “teeth.”
Paragraph .13. ED 00-2 states that safeguards include prohibitions, restrictions, 
disclosures (my emphasis), policies, procedures, etc. I encourage the Board to consider 
working with the SEC to require the auditor to report on Form 8-K any direct or implied 
threats from management.
Paragraph .17, a. In discussing the mitigation of self-interest threats, ED 00-2 suggests 
restrictions on the percentage of total firm fees earned from one auditee. I support this 
suggestion. However, audit decisions are made at the local office level, and by 
engagement personnel (partners). An additional safeguard would be to limit fees derived
from any one client at the level of the local office and at the level o f the individual 
partner.
Paragraph .24. ED 00-2 states that, “Independence decision makers should determine 
whether the level of independence risk is at an acceptable position on the independence 
risk continuum.” I disagree. A quasi-regulatory agency (i.e., the ISB) charged with 
protecting the public interest should make this decision. “High independence risk” 
should never be acceptable, and “remote independence risk” should be required for those 
engagements representing high risk to the public (e.g., large company size, widely 
dispersed ownership, weak governance characteristics, rapid company growth, high PE 
ratios, volatile industry, financial distress, etc.).
I have another concern with paragraph .24. I am unsure as to whether certain 
independence decision makers (e.g., the ISB, audit committees, boards o f directors, 
regulators) will have enough information to assess the substance, and not just the form, of 
safeguards that exist within auditing firms.
Paragraph .25. In this paragraph, ED 00-2 states that “ ... independence decision makers 
should consider only a very low level o f independence risk to be acceptable.” The 
continuum of independence risk presented on p. 9 does not contain a “very low level” of 
independence risk. Is a “very low level” between “no independence risk” and “remote 
independence risk” or between “remote independence risk” and “some independence 
risk.” In addition, it seems that paragraphs .24 and .25 are not entirely consistent. Are 
independence decision makers to decide on the acceptable level of independence risk or 
is it to be specified by the ISB?
Paragraph .27. ED 00-2 states that, “Independence decision makers should ensure that 
the benefits resulting from reducing independence risk by imposing additional safeguards 
exceed the costs o f those safeguards.” The benefits from reducing independence risk 
accrue to both current and potential investors and creditors and to society as a whole.
The costs are borne by the client and the audit firm. I do not believe that the costs and 
benefits should be weighted equally (i.e., the benefits should be weighted more heavily).
Paragraph .27, c. ED 00-2 discusses a benefit to senior management o f reduced 
independence risk as being more reliable financial information. I encourage the Board to 
recall that senior management is typically involved when an entity experiences severe 
financial reporting problems.
Minor Concerns
Paragraph 4. ED 00-2 states, “ ... an auditor must be free only from those factors that are 
so significant that they rise to a level where they compromise . . .” . You might consider 
explicitly stating that factors can achieve the necessary level o f significance such that 
independence might be compromised either alone (one very large threat to independence) 
or in combination (a series o f smaller threats to independence that, when considered 
together, represent a large threat).
Paragraph .22. A key concept throughout all o f ED 00-2 is that o f “independence 
decision makers.” Although this term is defined in the glossary (p. 13), I think its 
definition should appear early in the text because the entire Exposure Draft is dependent 
on the acceptance of this concept.
Paragraph .54. ED 00-2 states that “ ... in some cases, the costs of attempting to get 
closer to the “no independence risk” endpoint on the continuum may exceed the benefits 
of reducing independence risk. I encourage the Board to provide examples of such cases 
in the document.
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PACE ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT LUBIN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
U N I V E R S I T Y
ONE PACE PLAZA 
NEW YORK, NY 10038
PHONE: (212) 346-1960 
FAX: (212) 346-1573
26 February 2001
Mr. Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standard Board
1211 Avenue of Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel
On the attached sheet I have some comments re the November 2000 ED: Statement of Independence 
Concepts.
To present "concepts" in a lucid manner is not a simple task. At the same time, as I think about 
"independence" as a requirement for a public accountant, a clearer, more readily understandable 
explanation should be possible than is presented in this Exposure Draft.
I send my best wishes to you and your colleagues as you conclude your conceptual framework project.
Sincerely
Mary Ellen Oliverio 
Department of Accounting
Attached: Some comments
N E W  Y O R K  C I T Y  • W E S T C H E S T E R
EXPOSURE DRAFT
Statement of Independence Concepts
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence November 2000
COMMENTS:
(I must begin by noting a bias: Possibly, nothing captured my attention when I studied auditing more than 
the notion that an auditor was independent. When I began teaching auditing, the textbooks I read 
discussed independence as “the foundation" of the auditor's qualifications. I continue to believe that the 
significance of an auditor's contribution is related to an unrelenting respect for independence and 
persistent adherence to objectivity which is the operational outcome of that respect.)
Implied conceptualization is troublesome. The Statement seems to be implying that independence is 
"only one source. .. of quality audits." (page 2) Further on there is a discussion of "considering benefits 
and costs" in relation to independence risk. It appears that decision makers can determine the risk they 
wish to accept, (pages 9-10) How does "low level of independence risk" become reconciled with 
"consider benefits and costs." It appears that the concept of independence is just one of many factors 
and there is opportunity to substitute other factors that are perceived to be sufficient for quality audits.
Auditor independence is freedom from those pressures.. .  .(page 2) It is not clear how
"independence is freedom. . ."  Is not independence related to being able to separate one's decision 
making from pressures. "Freedom" is a somewhat unrealistic state... the client is paying the auditor 
and is interested in presenting the company in the most favorable position... and that client may threaten 
the auditor that “we will find another auditor who better understands us.. " . . .  Paragraph 4 is a very 
fuzzy, ambiguous series of sentences.
Threats to auditor independence, (page 4, 6) I wonder why there is not a more realistic identification 
of firm policies (including the valued position of the rainmaker), such as the basis for retention, and 
promotion that could impact auditor independence. There is, for example, a listing of "maintaining the 
tone at the top., .but should there be something more concrete than "stresses the expectation. . . "  (I 
teach auditing at the graduate level; many of our students accept positions with the Big-5 firms. One of 
the most disappointing experiences some former students explain to me is illustrated by this comment: 
"Yes, we get memos that we must adhere to policies-- every audit is to be high quality; however, that 
memo is for the record; it is not the reality.. . . " )
Why not detail costs as benefits are enumerated? (page 10) Paragraph 29, it seems to me, should 
enumerate the costs... this is another fuzzy paragraph.
Where on the continuum of auditor independence risk must an audit firm be before the auditors 
can issue an opinion that is not a disclaimer? The current guidance (AU504.08-.09), as you know, 
requires a disclaimer if auditors are not independent. Given the ED, it would appear that auditors would 
make no claim about being independent because they may have determined that the really important 
factors do not include independence. Will the Board provide the alternative ways that auditors will report 
how they assessed the level of independence that was sufficient for their purposes?
Has the Board considered deregulating independence? Why not let companies determine if they want an 
audit by an outside auditor. A publicly-owned company could be free to present its financial statements 
with a report from its own CFO which clearly establishes the fact that no outside auditor was engaged.
Mary Ellen Oliverio
Professor of Accounting
Pace University
New York, NY 10038
212 346 1819 moliverio@pace.edu
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Independence Standards Board 
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775 
Attn: ED 00-2
Re Statement of Independence Concepts,
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence, 
Exposure Draft 00-2
Dear Board Members:
Although we support the threats-and-safeguards structure of the Exposure Draft (ED), we 
believe that flaws would render the statement harmful to independence decision-making, 
and we oppose its adoption in the present form. The defects begin with the definition of 
auditor independence and permeate the document. The ED represents an untenable bal­
ance between the old, insupportable appearances approach to independence and an ap­
proach based on the risk of compromised objectivity. The appearances approach is in the 
definition of independence, implied by the goal of auditor independence, and in the 
fourth principle (paragraph 30). For these reasons, lack of coordination among the ideas, 
and misleading and ill-chosen language, the ED falls well short of the intellectually rig­
orous conceptual framework we need. In our comments below, we recommend improve­
ments that would make the document useful for its intended purposes.
The Definition’s Two Criteria
The ED’s definition of auditor independence should be more explicitly linked to the con­
cept of independence risk. It is flawed by absolutism, contains internal tensions, and is 
inconsistent with some of the other concepts. This greatly affects the usefulness of the 
ED, since the definition affects the meaning of other concepts and principles that use the 
word “independence,” and if the ED is adopted in its current form, the flaws would have 
a widespread effect on communications about independence. Here is the ED ’s definition:
Auditor independence is freedom from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or 
can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit deci­
sions. (paragraph 4)
KPMG LLP. KPMG LLP a U.S. limited liability partnership, is 
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The relationship between the two characteristics connected by the “or” is not apparent or 
explained, though the characteristics function as criteria indicating whether a party is or is 
not independent. Why should a person who cannot reasonably be expected to have com­
promised ability to make unbiased audit decisions (the second criterion) not be consid­
ered independent under the first criterion, which is implied by having both criteria? Can a 
person who does not satisfy the second criterion be considered independent under the 
first? The “or” functions as “and,” but no rationale for a definition with two different cri­
teria is given. If two criteria are not necessary, there should be only one. Independence 
concepts should be simple and spare whenever possible.
The First Criterion Is Absolute
The first criterion, “freedom from those pressures and other factors that compromise...,” 
is absolute. No person could be free from all the factors that compromise an auditor’s 
ability to make unbiased audit decisions. The criterion includes immaterially compro­
mised “ability to make unbiased audit decisions” and immaterial audit decisions. Audit 
decisions vary from those that influence the opinion to those that do not.
The criterion is absolute in another way. No one can determine prior to or during an audit 
whether the practitioner is free from all influences that compromise the ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions. There is no way to arrive at the conclusion that the criterion has 
been met.
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Paragraph 41 of the Basis for Conclusions argues that the definition is not absolute. 
However, paragraph 41’s argument is unconvincing. Whether or not an influence rises to 
the level of compromising audit decisions is irrelevant to whether it functions as an abso­
lute criterion. All influences that rise to such a level are defined as impairing independ­
ence. The criterion is severe enough never to be satisfied. Paragraph 40 points out that 
under the definition “auditors can be affected by pressures and other factors that do not 
bias audit decisions,” but such events are not of interest. Whether or not influences on 
auditors’ decisions on recreation or family matters are influenced by some factor does not 
make the population of interest, that is, the population of influences on audit decisions, 
any less absolutely complete.
Paragraph 41 says that the definition “describes a state that an auditor can attain, namely, 
the ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” However, the sentence focuses on the 
wrong state. The issue that the definition raises is whether the auditor is free of all influ­
ences that bias audit decisions, not whether the auditor can make unbiased audit deci­
sions. In any case, no one can determine either state in advance of an audit with a suffi­
ciency to satisfy the absolute nature of the definition.
In contrast, independence decision makers can determine whether the risk of impaired 
objectivity is unacceptable. As paragraph 6 of the ED says, “To be independent, an audi­
tor must be able...to overcome pressures and other factors that would prevent unbiased 
audit decisions.” Overcoming pressures and other factors is not being free of them. They 
are always present in some manner and in some degree. The audit fee is frequently cited 
to illustrate this point.
3The Definition’s The Second Criterion
Eliminating the definition’s absolute element would leave: “Freedom from those pres­
sures and other factors that can reasonably be expected to compromise an auditor’s abil­
ity to make unbiased audit decisions.” However, apart from its insupportable interpreta­
tion as a criterion for appearance of independence,1 the definition using the reasonable- 
expectation criterion would not be desirable for this reason: It would be insufficiently 
linked to the idea of independence risk. (The relationship between the first criterion in the 
ED’s definition and independence risk is treated below under a separate heading.)
The ED’s first two principles reflect an independence-risk approach. The definition of 
independence should be linked to the independence-risk approach and the defined con­
cept of independence risk. In addition and more importantly, the public interest is best 
served by a realistic definition of independence, and the only realistic definition of inde­
pendence is based on an acceptable level of independence risk. Rulemakers’ decisions 
about independence have always been about independence risk and always will be. No 
standard setter or regulator has attempted to ban every potential influence on auditor ob­
jectivity, including the audit fee, and no party has, to our knowledge, argued that it is 
necessary. Despite rhetoric about appearance of independence, even language about ap­
pearances in rules and requirements, no standard setter or regulator has attempted to ban 
practices because of appearances.
The test is not whether the rulemakers say they are using such a criterion, but how they 
go about making the rules. They have not, to our knowledge, sought defensible evidence 
of appearances, evaluated what that evidence meant, applied the findings, and regularly 
updated the rules for new findings on appearances or confirmed that the rules in place 
reflected current findings on appearances. Appearances change, and the stringency of 
rules would have to be altered as such changes occurred. Evidence that this has never 
been done lies in the plain fact that appearance of independence has never been used to 
consider relaxing independence requirements, much less actually relaxing them, even 
though evidence has been available that auditors’ independence and work are well 
thought of by constituents. The ISB’s Earnscliffe research is an example.
The idea of appearance of independence should not be available for arbitrary use in justi­
fying prohibitions that cannot be justified as necessary to reduce independence risk to an 
acceptable level. Standard setters should not be encouraged to pretend they are applying 
the appearances criterion when they are merely paying it lip service. No conceptual 
framework with an appearances criterion can be considered forthright and thorough if it 
fails to acknowledge that the criterion has been used only by name in the past and has 
never been honored by the hard, and impracticable, work of ongoing research and main­
tenance. If fully pursued, an appearances criterion would probably never meet a cost- 
benefit test.
1
See paragraph 2 of the Summary and paragraphs 42-45 of the Basis for Conclusions.
4The notion that the “reasonable expectation” is the expectation of “well-informed inves­
tors and other users of financial information” (paragraph 4) is an appearance-of-inde- 
pendence concept. Note that it goes beyond the well-informed to include those not-well- 
informed (“and other users of financial information”). We have explained before why 
such a criterion is arbitrary, conceptually unsound, and inconsistent with evidence that 
investors and other stakeholders take no interest in independence rulemaking, do not 
know independence rules, and are unaware of the specifics of independence situations. 
Our arguments are reproduced in the appendix to this letter.
In another inconsistency, the ED’s own statements show how ill-advised is the appear­
ances approach to “reasonable expectation.” Paragraph 38 says,
[T]he Board recognizes that investors, users, and other interested parties ordinarily cannot ob­
tain information about pressures and other factors that may affect a specific auditor’s ability 
in a specific audit engagement to make unbiased audit decisions. They rely on independence 
decision makers to identify and analyze various activities, relationships, and other circum­
stances that are sources of pressures and other factors that can reasonably be expected to lead 
to biased audit decisions, and to adopt appropriate safeguards, if necessary, to reduce inde­
pendence risk to an acceptably low level.
This statement suggests it is wrong and unworkable to treat “reasonable expectation” as 
the expectation of “well-informed investors and other users of financial information.”
The Definition: Incom patibility w ith Independence Risk
The absolute criterion of independence (“freedom from those pressures and other factors 
that compromise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions”) is inconsistent 
with the concept of independence risk. Independence risk is the risk remaining, after bal­
ancing threats and safeguards, that the auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions 
will be compromised. The absolute criterion means there is no such risk (total freedom 
from compromising factors) or the auditor is not independent. In other words, under the 
absolute criterion, and therefore the definition, for practical purposes, independence risk 
is never operational. However, as paragraph 25 says, “Given certain factors in the envi­
ronment in which audits take place...independence risk cannot be completely eliminated 
and, therefore, independence decision makers always accept some risk that auditors’ ob­
jectivity will be compromised.” The statement is inconsistent with the definition’s abso­
lute criterion of independence.
The Definition: Objectivity and Independence
The absolute first criterion in the ED’s definition may derive from the desire to assert that 
independence is more than just following rules (as is argued in ED paragraph 6) and to 
preclude anyone from holding to such an assumption. If so, the exercise is tilting wind­
mills. No one is going to be prevented from believing that following the rules yields a 
claim to independence. Even rulemakers must believe that following the rules they set 
yields a claim to independence. Otherwise they should turn in their credentials as protec­
tors of users of financial statements. Are the ISB and its staff to hold in public that the 
standards they issue are not sufficient to ensure auditor independence?
5More importantly, those who are trying to come to grips with the conditions that make for 
independence should not be confused into thinking that objectivity is identical to inde­
pendence. The absolute criterion for independence effectively creates such an equiva­
lency. It makes independence dependent on freedom from “pressures and other factors 
that compromise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” The auditor so 
absolutely free from undermining factors is automatically, by definition, 100 percent ob­
jective. There would be no need for a definition of “independence” if all it meant in the 
end was objectivity in making audit decisions. Objectivity is a common, widely under­
stood term. The pretense that a synonym, “independence,” is a different quality is confus­
ing.
Evidence that the ISB staff and project leaders realized they had built into the definition 
an equivalency between independence and objectivity is in a recent article they published 
in the Journal o f Accountancy. It states: “The proposed definition compels the auditor to 
make a personal assessment of his or her objectivity—to determine if pressures and other 
factors compromise the ability to make unbiased audit decisions.”2 As already noted, 
paragraph 41 of the ED says that the definition “describes a state that an auditor can at­
tain, namely, the ability to make unbiased [i.e., objective] audit decisions.”
The Definition: Threats and Safeguards
The definition of independence is not coordinated with the concepts of threats and safe­
guards. This flaw also supports our argument that a more explicit link is needed between 
the definition of independence and the concept of independence risk.
Safeguards “mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence,” which means, accord­
ing to the definition of threats, safeguards mitigate or eliminate “sources of potential bias 
that may compromise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” Thus by 
definition safeguards have no effect on pressures and other factors that in fact compro­
mise an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions. They therefore have no effect 
on the absolute criterion in the ED’s definition (“freedom from those pressures and other 
factors that compromise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions”). Such 
pressures by definition create bias. It is arguable that review procedures can mitigate 
compromised objectivity. A concurring partner’s review can right a biased audit decision. 
Unfortunately, that does not solve the problem. Safeguards are defined as mitigating 
threats, not “pressures and other factors that compromise...an auditor’s ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions.” That is, safeguards, again, are defined as mitigating “sources 
of potential bias.” Thus review procedures function as safeguards only to the degree that 
they prevent biased audit decisions, not to the degree that they rectify such decisions. In 
these ways, the definition of independence does not coordinate with the definitions of 
threats and safeguards.
2 Susan McGrath, Arthur Siegel, Thomas W. Dunfee, Alan S. Glazer, and Henry R. Jaenicke, “A Frame­
work for Auditor Independence,” Journal o f Accountancy, January 2001, p. 40.
6Our Recommended Definition
Here is the way the definition, with some editorial pruning, might look explicitly linked 
to independence risk:
Auditor independence is freedom from any factors that create an unacceptable risk of biased 
audit decisions.
This definition could be made more explicit. It does not say that it is limited to material 
matters. However, the notions of material influences on objectivity and material or sig­
nificant audit decisions are lodged in the qualifier “unacceptable.” We recommend a ver­
sion of this definition.
The fat should be trimmed from any conceptual-framework definition, and the ED’s ver­
sion has fat. “Any factors” is equivalent to “pressures and other factors,” though we 
would prefer a less abstract term (e.g., “conditions” or “influences”). One of the aims of a 
conceptual framework is to make discourse on independence more efficient and fruitful. 
That cause is not served by using “pressures and other factors” every time a single word 
would convey the same message.
The independence-risk approach to defining independence would in a different way serve 
the purpose evoked in paragraph 6 of the ED, which as we have seen, attempts to pre­
clude those who follow the independence rules from claiming to be “independent,” as the 
ED defines it. Under the independence-risk approach, no one would have an unchal­
lengeable claim that following the rules means being objective, because independence 
would not be equivalent to objectivity. Moreover, no one can know the level of inde­
pendence risk in any circumstance. It must be estimated by all independence decision 
makers. That would not prevent people and rulemakers from legitimately claiming the 
rules indeed produce independence, but everyone who followed these matters would 
know that an acceptable level of independence risk is a level targeted by the standard set­
ters making the claim, not something absolute, universal, and incapable of being adjusted. 
And everyone would know that independence was not the same as objectivity. A concep­
tual framework that does public service should not conclude its passage defining inde­
pendence with the words: “Compliance with the rules is a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition for independence.” It makes the ED’s talk of more credible financial statements 
through independence empty and ironic. Compliance with the rules should be a sufficient 
condition for independence, but not a sufficient condition for being objective.
The text elaborating the ED ’s definition illustrates that a definition based on an “unac­
ceptable risk of biased audit decisions” is superior to one based on the criterion “can rea­
sonably be expected to compromise an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit deci­
sions.” Sentence three of paragraph 5 says that rules prohibiting activities and relation­
ships apply to all auditors because “it is reasonable to expect audit decisions to be biased 
in those circumstances.” However, this statement follows another recognizing that some 
auditors’ objectivity would not be impaired by the activities and relationships, and it is 
obvious that auditors differ in their ability to withstand influences that could affect objec­
tivity. Thus it is not reasonable to expect that audit decisions would “be biased in those
7circumstances.” In fact, it is reasonable to believe that because auditors’ levels of imper­
viousness to threats to objectivity can never be known, rules prohibiting activities and 
relationships mean the risk of impaired objectivity was considered unacceptable.3
Redundant Definition of Independence Risk
Here is the way the definition of independence risk from paragraph 18 would look with 
the term “auditor independence” replaced by its definition from paragraph 4. The re­
placement is in square brackets:
Independence risk is the risk that threats to [freedom from those pressures and other factors 
that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions], to the extent that they are not mitigated by safeguards, compro­
mise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise an auditor’s ability to make unbiased au­
dit decisions”
Redundancy is immediately apparent. All that would be necessary to convey the intended 
meaning is “Independence risk is the risk that threats to auditor independence are not 
mitigated by safeguards.”
Goal of Auditor Independence
Through the ambiguous word “support,” the goal allows that the credibility of the finan­
cial reporting process is an end of auditor independence separate from the goal of reliable 
financial reporting. This interpretation would contribute to the appearances approach to 
independence and is inconsistent with what auditors do and the public interest in what 
auditors do. Auditors undertake no activities designed to influence the credibility of the 
financial reporting process. Audit procedures are designed to obtain sufficient evidence to 
arrive at a correct opinion on the financial statements. Auditing standards are restricted to 
delineating what is required to arrive at correct opinions, and audit reports are carefully 
worded to avoid any other implications. They avoid all other implications because the 
evidence gathered in compliance with the standards pertains to the reliability of the fi­
nancial statements, not to the desirability of owning the auditee’s stock. A clean audit re­
port follows an evidence-gathering process that could have resulted in an adverse opin­
ion.
“Capital market efficiency,” cited in the goal, refers primarily to the market’s efficient 
impounding of information, a pricing mechanism.4 It refers to both audited and unaudited 
information. It should not be a goal of auditor independence to have information im­
pounded in prices regardless of whether it is reliable or not.
3 Sentence two of the same paragraph allows that rules apply generally because of the threat of bias (poten­
tial source of bias), which is consistent with the risk approach and inconsistent with the third sentence that 
is the subject of the paragraph above.
4 As Burton G. Malkiel points out, “Markets can be efficient even if they make errors in the valuation of 
individual stocks and exhibit greater volatility than can apparently be explained by fundamentals such as 
earnings and dividends.” Burton G. Malkiel, “Are Markets Efficient? Yes, Even if they Make Errors,” The 
Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2000, p. A10. Barron’s Dictionary o f Business Terms defines efficient 
market this way: “theory that market prices reflect the knowledge and expectations of all investors.” (Bar­
ron’s Educational Series, Inc.: New York, 1987).
8Everyone knows about the risks of a “bubble economy” and “irrational exuberance.” 
Confidence in financial reports can be engendered by fraudulent activities. It would be 
improper for auditors to work for confidence in financial statements or the capital mar­
kets by any means other than helping to ensure the reliability of financial reports. Indeed, 
the threats to independence listed in paragraph 13 of the ED include “advocacy,” which is 
contrasted with unbiased work on the financial statements. Advocacy, by inference, 
would include working to enhance public credibility for the financial statements apart 
from the work to evaluate their reliability.
The effect of high quality auditing, and therefore more reliable information, on the capital 
markets is better decisions by investors and creditors, the kind of decisions more likely to 
lead to economic growth and stability than decisions based on less reliable information. If 
the ED’s goal is retained, which we do not recommend, “capital market efficiency” 
should be replaced by “capital market effectiveness.”
We recommend the goal of auditor independence be based on what high quality auditing 
does for the economy, that is, on increasing the reliability of financial statements. Here is 
the way such a goal would look:
The goal of auditor independence is to make it more likely that audits improve the reliability 
of financial statements.
Independence Concepts—The Threat Categories
The threat categories are insufficiently distinctive to be useful. Paragraph 12 admits that 
they are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, but the admission does not make the cate­
gories useful. Quite the contrary, the admission indicates the categories cannot be relied 
on to discuss threats in a consistent way. What one party identifies as a threat of a 
particular category, another, by the ED’s own admission, can rightly ascribe to a different 
category. Apart from that, there is no need to have a set of threat categories in the 
conceptual framework.
In any case, these threat categories are particularly clumsy. The first of them, “self- 
interest,” is generic and includes the remaining four. The description of the self-interest 
threat is unequivocally expansive and inclusive: “Self-interests include auditors’ emo­
tional, financial, or other personal interests” (paragraph 12, item a, sentence 1). No 
threats are excluded from such a category. The “self-review threat,” for example, arises 
because the auditor has emotional and often financial interests in the work performed. 
The “intimidation threat” works only if the auditor has a self-interest that can be threat­
ened, such as the audit fee in the case of threatened firing. The advocacy threat includes 
the auditor promoting an auditee’s securities, a role that creates a self-interest in sales of 
the securities or arises from a desire to retain the audit fee. The familiarity threat is a per­
sonal interest (a “particularly close or long-standing personal or professional relationship 
with the auditee”).
9The accompanying text is evidence of the sloppy thinking that the overlapping categories 
prompt and their singular inappropriateness for a conceptual framework. Self-interest 
threats do not necessarily “arise from auditors acting in their own interest” (paragraph 12, 
item a, sentence 1). Auditors’ self-interests include maintaining their reputation, avoiding 
liability, and retaining the respect of their peers. Acting in pursuit of these self-interests 
does not threaten auditors’ objectivity or independence. The implication that self-interest 
threats necessarily “arise from auditors acting in their own interest” is contradicted by the 
third sentence in item a: “Auditors may favor, consciously or subconsciously, those self- 
interests over their interest in performing a quality audit.” This sentence admits that audi­
tors have a self-interest in audit quality, and such a self-interest is entirely in keeping with 
objective audit judgments.
The examples of safeguards include self-interests (“the value auditing firms and individ­
ual auditors place on their reputations,” “the legal liability faced by auditors and other 
participants”).5 It makes no sense to have a threat category so broad that it includes safe­
guards.
The sentence defining the advocacy threat contains a false opposition: “promoting or ad­
vocating for or against an auditee’s position or opinion rather than serving as unbiased 
attestors of the auditees’ financial statements” (paragraph 12, item c, sentence 1). The 
unbiased audit report with a clean opinion on the reliability of the financial statements 
promotes the client’s position that they are reliable. An auditor who takes the same posi­
tion as the client in discussions with the SEC can be totally objective.
Item d, discussing the familiarity threat, is circular. It says, “Such a threat is present if 
auditors are not sufficiently skeptical of an auditee’s assertions and, as a result, too read­
ily accept an auditee’s viewpoint because of their familiarity with or trust in the auditee.” 
This sentence has the threat arising if the auditor has impaired objectivity (insufficient 
skepticism), which means that if the auditor is not independent, the threat is present. 
Apart from the circularity, the “threat” ignores that in effective audits, the auditor typi­
cally has good working relationships with the clients and relies on them for some infor­
mation and audit evidence.
The analysis immediately above demonstrates that threat categories a. through e. are not 
useful. The set is fundamentally and consistently flawed.
Independence Concepts—Safeguards
There is no stated advantage to describing safeguards in three ways as is done in para­
graphs 14-16. All the reader is told is that safeguards “can be described” in this way or 
that way. Discourse on independence is not served by a conceptual framework that offers 
three options for talking about a single thing unless some unique purpose is served by 
each of the three.
5 Paragraph 14, items a.1 and a.7.
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The three are now incoherent. All but one of the items in paragraph 14 are preventive, 
and the exception needs to be revised to be unambiguously preventive. Yet paragraph 15 
treats preventive safeguards as one of four categories. The other three categories in para­
graph 15 are also preventive. No procedure or condition can qualify as a safeguard unless 
it mitigates or eliminates threats (potential sources of bias). That means safeguards pre­
vent the potential source of bias from having the undesirable effect on objective auditing. 
In that sense, they are preventive. They may have other characteristics as well, but the 
characteristics that make them safeguards are preventive. For this reason, item 14.a.7 
should be revised. It is only the prospect of disciplinary actions that function as safe­
guards. Disciplinary actions are safeguards only to the extent that they deter other audi­
tors from biased auditing and violations of independence rules.
The first sentence of paragraph 16 is untrue. All safeguards do not “restrict activities or 
relationships,” as demonstrated by the list in paragraph 14.
A partial remedy to the discord in this passage would be to delete paragraph 15, charac­
terize all the examples in paragraph 14 as preventive, and state that paragraph 16 refers 
only to a subset of what is in paragraph 14 (for example: “Safeguards that restrict activi­
ties or relationships can be divided into four types”).
Paragraph 17 shows the interaction of safeguards with the useless threat categories ana­
lyzed above. The paragraph should be deleted and its first two sentences relocated in 
paragraph 14. Since the threat categories are by admission not mutually exclusive, their 
correlations with safeguards are not mutually exclusive.
The Interested-Parties’-Views Principle (paragraphs 30-32)
Paragraph 30 sets out the ED’s fourth principle of independence. It directs independence 
decision makers to consider the views of parties with an interest in financial reporting and 
to resolve independence issues “based on the decision makers’ judgment about how best 
to meet the goal of auditor independence.” We believe the principle’s final words should 
be “based on the decision makers’ judgment about how best to arrive at an acceptable 
level o f independence risk.”
It is inconsistent to direct independence decision makers to determine an acceptable level 
of independence risk (the first two principles) and to consider costs and benefits (the third 
principle) and then to tell the same decision makers to resolve issues by a wholly differ­
ent method, namely, by resorting somehow to the goal of independence, which, though 
vague, can be interpreted as based on stakeholders’ attitudes. The interpretation is en­
couraged by the last sentence of paragraph 32 (“In order to achieve the goal of auditor 
independence..., all independence decision makers...should be sensitive to the likely 
views of investors, other users, and other interested parties, and the impact their decisions 
may have on those views”). The fourth principle should be consistent with the prior three. 
It can be made consistent by the change we recommend.
Paragraph 59 of the Basis for Conclusions, explaining this principle, says independence 
decision makers should ask “whether well-informed investors and other users would rea­
sonably consider the activities, relationships, or other circumstances in question as pre­
cluding independence.” As already pointed out, “and other users” incorporates the views 
of not-well-informed stakeholders. More importantly, it does not serve the public interest 
to try to go in this way beyond the wisdom and effectiveness of arguments gathered from 
interested parties and the Board’s own reasoning and findings. Speculation about atti­
tudes of fictional parties, even fictional “well-informed” parties, does not serve the public 
interest. It opens the road to fuzzy thinking and arbitrary decisions. It tells those inter­
ested parties who do submit reasoned views that they are unimportant, because the Board 
is going to consider instead the hypothetical views of “well-informed investors and other 
users.” Participation by interested parties in ISB standard setting would decline from its 
already low level when it is realized that the Board’s approach as indicated by paragraph 
59 supersedes evaluating the risk of compromised objectivity based on available argu­
ment and evidence about threats and safeguards.
Paragraph 56 of the Basis for Conclusions says that the Board considered three ap­
proaches to this principle and that it rejected “developing] standards that reflect the 
likely views of reasonable, fully informed investors or some other group or groups of in­
terested parties.” The sentence at issue from paragraph 59 brings to bear the approach 
paragraph 56 says the Board rejected.
We recognize that a Board or other independence decision makers would be free to say 
the goal of independence is best achieved by focusing exclusively on the risk model in 
the first three principles. That would be a better outcome than attempting to resolve is­
sues according to the appearances-approach that can be read into the idea of achieving the 
goal or according to the hypothetical investor approach from paragraph 59. But it would 
not be an ineluctable outcome, and it would not be a consistent outcome. It would depend 
on politics and personalities. The process would demonstrate that the conceptual frame­
work in this ED is attended by too many internal tensions and confusions to do the job it 
is supposed to do, create a principles-based approach to independence decisions. The ten­
sions and confusions would be greatly reduced by the change we recommend to this prin­
ciple.
Principles of Auditor Independence—The Risk Continuum
The independence-risk continuum in paragraph 23 uses language that is internally incon­
sistent. The five-point range of likelihoods ascends with these descriptors: virtually im­
possible, very unlikely, possible, probable, and virtually certain. Here are the first- and 
second-entry dictionary definitions of “possible” and “probable” :
possible -  1. Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, 
laws or circumstances. 2. Capable of occurring or being done without offense to character, 
nature, or custom.
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probable -  1. Likely to happen or be true. 2. Likely but uncertain; plausible.6
6 Both definitions are taken from The American Heritage Dictionary o f the English Language, Third Edi­
tion (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston and New York, 1996).
Clearly, all that is probable is possible. It is equally clear that the scale makes no sense at 
all with the word “possible” at its center. The points on both sides of what is possible are 
also possible; that is, “very unlikely” and “probable” are both possible. In fact, everything 
on the scale is possible except, perhaps, “virtually impossible.”
In short, because of the descriptors, the continuum in its current form is nonsense and 
should not be in the conceptual framework.
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***
If you have any questions about our comments and recommendations, please contact 
John M. Guinan at 212-909-5449 orjguinan@kpmg.com.
KPMG LLP
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Appendix
Why the Appearance-of-lndependence Approach (Perceptions-of- 
Investors Approach) Is Conceptually Unsound and Inconsistent 
with the Real World of Independence Decision Making
Excerpts from KPMG’s Response to Discussion Memorandum 00- 
1, May 26, 2000
[On the goal of independence]
A conceptual framework with such a goal—that is, one that separated achieving credibil­
ity from its origin in achieving reliability— would embrace and implicitly endorse audi­
tors who commit fraud, auditors who violate generally accepted auditing standards 
(GAAS), incompetent auditors, and baseless confidence in financial statements and in 
capital markets that can lead to instability and misallocated capital. These points are 
given briefly but more specifically below:
■ The auditor who knowingly works for credibility apart from reliability commits fraud 
and does so in the same way that a preparer of fraudulent financial statements com­
mits fraud—by intentionally misleading users of financial statements.
■ The auditor who unknowingly works for credibility apart from reliability is incompe­
tent or the same as an incompetent. Providing a clean opinion on materially misstated 
financial statements delivers credibility without reliability.
■ The auditor who works for credibility apart from reliability violates generally ac­
cepted auditing standards (GAAS), because GAAS demands sufficient evidence and 
is designed to ensure correct opinions. The auditor’s work and deliverable are de­
voted exclusively to reliability.
■ Confidence in financial statements is not always good for the capital markets or the 
economy. It is not good for them when the confidence is unwarranted and can lead to 
destabilized markets and ineffectively allocated capital.
These four points compel this conclusion: A conceptual framework for independence that 
incorporates the idea that credibility of financial statements is a goal separate from their 
reliability, a goal that can and should be pursued on its own by auditors, would bring 
within the realm of accepted behavior actions contrary to the public interest. Indeed, it 
would implicitly treat that behavior as professionally desirable and in the interests of au­
dit independence and audit quality. No public-spirited party should want such thoughts in 
the ISB’s conceptual framework.
Audit quality leads to reliable financial statements, which, other things being equal, 
would add to their credibility. How otherwise should an auditor work for credibility? As­
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suming the work for credibility apart from reliability excluded the nefarious options cited 
above, what seems to remain is public relations and sales efforts of the sort that lead ac­
countants to be criticized for behaving commercially instead of professionally. There is 
certainly nothing professional in touting credibility apart from reliability. The effect 
would therefore be self-defeating, reducing the credibility of auditors and audited finan­
cial statements.
[On the appearances approach to independence]
Paragraph 74 concedes that stakeholders do not know the members of the audit team of 
the company they own or are considering for investment. This makes goals based on the 
individual auditor’s appearance inoperative and inappropriate. For this reason, paragraph 
74 states: “[I]t can be argued that users’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions of, and their 
confidence in, the improved financial statement reliability added by an independent audi­
tor may depend on their beliefs about the independence of auditors generally and about 
the effectiveness of the totality of the self-regulatory and public regulatory processes, in­
cluding those concerning auditor independence, that help ensure audit quality.”
This seems to be a version of the idea of profession-independence from R. K. Mautz and 
Hussein A. Sharaf, more recently cited and explicated in an article by Douglas R. Carmi­
chael in The CPA Journal.7 As Carmichael words it, “Profession-independence is the ap­
parent independence of auditors, as a professional group, to the public.” The idea reap­
pears in paragraph 168 (Section VII of the DM), and Mautz and Sharaf are quoted in a 
footnote.
The profession-independence argument does not support the inclusion of credibility (or 
appearance) goals, definitions, concepts, or principles in a conceptual framework for 
auditor independence. The auditor on the job who is following independence rules is un­
witnessed. Such unwitnessed activity and compliance cannot affect profession- 
independence (or appearance of independence). Auditors’ collective performance is the 
primary influence on profession-independence, because audit failures get in the press, 
public figures talk about them, and steps are taken to prevent them, which also can attract 
attention. A consistently high level of audit failures would depress public estimates of 
audit quality and from that base, everything connected to it. Note, however, that it is audit 
quality that is perceived, not audit independence. If audit quality is the primary determi­
nant of profession-independence, independence goals, definitions, concepts, principles, 
and standards would contribute to profession-independence best by contributing to audit 
quality—in other words by focusing on the auditor’s job under GAAS, to boost the reli­
ability of financial reporting. There would be no argument for a separate self-sufficient 
goal of credibility apart from the goal of the reliability of financial statements.
Institutions and authorities, primarily standard setters and enforcement bodies, also can 
contribute to profession-independence by the respect they generate. Thus, apart from au-
7 Douglas R. Carmichael, “In Search of Concepts of Auditor Independence,” The CPA Journal, May 1999, 
pp. 39-43.
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dit quality and its consequences, so-called profession-independence is based primarily on 
stakeholders’ perceptions of regulators. Perceptions of regulators and the regulatory envi­
ronment are not perceptions of auditors, whether individually or as a group. At most there 
are derived impressions of auditors, audit quality, and audit independence.
This process should not be confused with stakeholders’ perceptions of specific rules and 
rulemaking processes. Stakeholders, as a group, do not know about the rules that institu­
tions and authorities make and have made. We know this, for instance, from the 
Earnscliffe research, but it can also be inferred from the complexity and arcane nature of 
independence rules and from the extremely low level of stakeholder participation in the 
ISB’s standard-setting operation. Because we have good reason to believe that there is no 
widespread following of independence standard setting by stakeholders, basing standards 
on how the ISB might appear could not have any significant influence on profession- 
independence.
Moreover, even if most stakeholders did follow standard setting closely, basing standards 
for audit independence on the image of the standard setters, not on what they do for audit 
quality and the reliability of financial statements, would diminish profession- 
independence, not raise it. Consider the consequence of public perceptions that the stan­
dard setters were basing rules not on audit quality, but on how they, the standard setters, 
were perceived. Rational stakeholders would evaluate independence standard setters (or 
standards, if they did evaluate them) for their effect on the fact of independence, that is, 
for their effect on the auditor’s work for reliability of financial statements. If they learned 
that standard setters were not setting standards to boost audit quality through the fact of 
independence, confidence in standard setting would plummet, as well it should. The idea 
that the standard setters had ceased to be independent judges of what was best for audit 
quality or audit independence, and instead were devoted primarily to how they appear, 
would be dispiriting to all stakeholders. Putting such ideas in a conceptual framework 
would ensure the dive in confidence. In short, arguments that independence standards 
should be based on the image of standard setters risks depressing stakeholders’ confi­
dence in the standard-setting process and in profession-independence.
The ISB has been constitutionally devised to build confidence in its work. It has an open 
standard-setting process that could generate additional profession-independence, other 
things being equal. Thus, new steps have been taken fairly recently to build profession- 
independence. We should let them work.
Stakeholders’ perceptions (the separate credibility goal, the appearance of independence 
approach to independence, the idea of profession-independence) should not be in a goal 
or in a definition of independence or in any concepts mentioned in Section V. Appear­
ances, apart from the fact of independence, cannot affect audit quality or audit objectivity 
or change the risk of fraud or the risk of financial injury to the investing public. They do 
not affect in any way the reliability of financial statements. As we have seen, because 
stakeholders do not perceive the conditions that affect auditors’ objectivity on the job or
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the auditors’ compliance with the rules and do not know the independence rules, the as­
sumptions governing them, or how they are changing, profession-independence is based 
primarily on audit quality and stakeholders’ attitudes toward institutions and authorities. 
Setting standards based on contributing to audit quality is consistent with contributing to 
profession-independence, because it improves audit quality. The notion that standard set­
ters are basing standards on how they, the standard setters, might appear could damage 
stakeholder trust in the system and profession-independence. Apart from that, it would be 
of limited effect, given the low level of stakeholder awareness of what standard setters 
are doing. The best way for institutions and authorities to win stakeholders’ approval and 
confidence, therefore, is to base rules on what reduces risks to auditors’ objectivity to an 
acceptable level, to thereby promote reliable financial statements, and to do this through 
confidence-inducing due process.
[On an interested-parties-views principle]
To adopt the principle that standards should directly reflect stakeholders’ perceptions 
(proposed principle 9A) would be pretense and sham. Standard setting is incompatible 
with an abstract, pure democratic model, where the standards are made by the views of 
the constituents. Kenneth Arrow, the Nobel laureate, showed that ideal outcomes could 
not be a direct aggregation of constituent preferences.8 It would be inefficient, even if it 
were feasible, to collect stakeholders’ perceptions in order to create standards from them 
in a manner that reflects them all, or reflects even investors’ perceptions alone. Percep­
tions differ and change over time, and research instruments must avoid shaping opinion 
when obtaining it. Participation in the standard-setting process to date suggests that re­
sponses to discussion documents can never be a source of representative comment. There 
would be no reason to have a highly qualified Board if its sole function was to serve as a 
conduit for some measure of stakeholder opinion. The Board’s obligation to set standards 
with due-process input and its own thinking and deliberative processes reflects a sensible 
division of labor. There is no reason to assume that busy investors want to study inde­
pendence issues and drafts in order to have their views reflected directly in the Board’s 
standards. They want to be able to trust the Board, and the Board will violate that trust if 
it publicly endorses giving away its responsibility to set standards to a requirement to find 
some measure called stakeholders’ perceptions.
The Board would lose any right to constituents’ cooperation if it asked for their views 
and then put them in the trash in favor of the views of a hypothetical set of investors 
(proposed principle 9B). All constituents who read the conceptual framework would 
know the Board was going to trash their views, that the Board was just going through the 
motions of meaningful due process. Constituents in such circumstances need not read the 
conceptual framework to learn about the Board’s insult to their intelligence and misuse of 
their time. All they would have to do is read the basis for the Board’s conclusions in its 
standard-setting documents. The Board would there confess that regardless of whatever 
wisdom and analytical truths constituents offered, the Board made decisions based on the
8 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Social Choice and Justice,” Collected Papers o f Kenneth J. Arrow, vol. 1, (Cam­
bridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press).
hypothetical fully informed investor. The Board has received relatively little input so far 
The well would soon run dry.
17
21
American Accounting Association’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee 
Comments on the ISB’s Exposure Draft ED 00-2:
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
Stephen G. Ryan, Chair; Robert H. Herz; Teresa E. Iannaconi; 
Laureen A. Maines; Krishna Palepu; Katherine Schipper; 
Catherine M. Schrand; Douglas J. Skinner; Linda Vincent
The Financial Accounting Standards Committee o f the American Accounting 
Association (hereinafter the Committee) is charged with responding to requests for input 
on issues related to financial reporting. The Committee is pleased to respond to the ISB’s 
invitation to comment on the Exposure Draft ED 00-2: A Conceptual Framework fo r  
Auditor Independence (hereinafter the Exposure Draft). The comments in this letter 
reflect the views o f the individuals on the Committee and not those o f the American 
Accounting Association.
Our response to the Exposure Draft is presented in three sections. The first section 
presents the Committee’s views as to characteristics o f a conceptually sound framework 
for auditor independence, noting which o f these characteristics are and are not contained 
in the Exposure Draft. The second section summarizes empirical academic literature on 
auditor independence that is relevant to the conceptual framework. The third section 
contains responses to the specific questions posed in the Exposure Draft. These 
responses are based on the views laid out in the first section and empirical academic 
research discussed in the second section.
Conceptual basis for a framework for auditor independence
The Committee believes the following characteristics should underlie a conceptual 
framework for auditor independence. These characteristics are classified according to (1) 
characteristics o f persons associated with or affected by auditor independence, (2) 
characteristics related to consequences o f auditor independence, and (3) characteristics 
related to the evaluation o f auditor independence.
Characteristics o f  persons associated with or affected by auditor independence
1. The framework should recognize that independence resides in persons. An 
independence framework should distinguish the auditor from his/her firm and should 
acknowledge that the individual auditor faces incentives and penalties that may differ 
from those facing the audit firm as a whole.
2. The framework should recognize that the entity whose financial reports are the 
subject of the audit is not a natural person (i.e., the client) with a unique state o f mind. 
Rather, the committee believes the framework should adopt a contracting view, in 
which a corporation is composed of multiple groups of economic agents, each with
potentially different interests. The auditor has relations and interactions with several 
of the contracting parties who comprise the entity whose financial reports are being 
audited. For example, an auditor might interact with members o f management and 
the audit committee o f the board o f directors. Since the latter have an oversight 
function with respect to the former, the interests of the two (management and audit 
committee) cannot be assumed to be identical.
3. The framework should recognize that the benefits of auditor independence depend on 
the perceptions o f individuals who rely on auditors’ decisions. These perceptions 
include both those related to various factors that create and mitigate bias in auditors’ 
decisions and those related to the importance of independence to the overall quality of 
auditors’ decisions. The framework should consider primarily the views of 
“reasonable” financial statement users who have full information and process this 
information appropriately.
Characteristics related to consequences o f  auditor independence
4. The framework should recognize that the relevant consequence o f auditor 
independence is its effect on auditors’ decisions.
5. The framework should acknowledge that auditor independence has both benefits and 
costs. Such an approach would recognize that auditor independence is not an 
objective in and of itself, but is desirable if  it improves the quality o f auditors’ 
decisions and the decisions of individuals who rely upon auditors’ decisions. This 
approach also would recognize that there are costs to achieving auditor independence, 
which should be weighed against the benefits associated with independence.
6. The framework should recognize that the quality of auditors’ decisions is influenced 
by both their independence and competence (expertise). Specifically, in the 
assessment of the benefits and costs o f auditor independence, the framework should 
consider potential positive or negative effects on expertise o f attempts to achieve 
independence.
Characteristics related to the evaluation o f  auditor independence
7. The framework should evaluate auditor independence in terms of observable factors 
that are likely to influence whether an auditor’s decisions are unbiased, rather than in 
terms of unobservable factors, such as an auditor’s state o f mind. Observable factors 
include both factors that create bias in auditors’ decisions and factors that mitigate 
this bias.
8. The framework should evaluate an auditor’s independence in terms of a continuum 
(i.e., the degree of independence), rather than as a dichotomous variable (i.e., an 
auditor is either independent or not independent).
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The Committee believes that the Exposure Draft largely integrates characteristics 1, 
4, 5, and 8 into its framework for auditor independence. In the Committee’s opinion, the 
Exposure Draft’s framework integrates characteristics 3 and 7 in a limited fashion and 
does not integrate characteristics 2 and 6. We discuss issues related to the partial 
inclusion of characteristics 3 and 7 in our response to question 1 of the Exposure Draft. 
Additionally, we comment on the exclusion of characteristics 2 and 6 in our response to 
question 5 of the Exposure Draft.
Review and discussion of empirical research
The academic research provides evidence relevant to both the Committee’s views on 
characteristics of a conceptually sound framework and the Exposure Draft’s proposed 
auditor independence framework. The discussion of this research is organized into four 
sections: (1) factors that compromise auditor independence and lead to bias in auditors’ 
decisions, (2) factors that ameliorate impairments of auditor independence and bias in 
their decisions, (3) benefits and costs of auditor independence, and (4) users’ perceptions 
of auditor independence. Given the distinctive nature of auditors’ knowledge, auditing 
tasks, and the audit environment, we present conclusions about auditors’ judgments and 
decisions only from research which examines auditors doing tasks that are taken from, 
modeled on or adapted from their work environment, as opposed to conclusions from the 
general judgment and decision-making literature.1
1. Factors that compromise auditor independence
Research indicates that auditors’ judgments and decisions are influenced by 
observable task and environmental factors. These factors include an auditor’s 
involvement in prior audits o f  a client and incentives to retain audit or acquire non-audit 
engagements.
Tan (1995) shows that auditors’ judgments are influenced by their involvement in 
prior audits o f a client. Specifically, in his study, auditors who were involved in the 
prior-year audit paid more attention to current-year audit information that was consistent 
with judgments made for the prior-year audit than did auditors who were not involved in 
the prior-year audit. This suggests that auditors do not evaluate their own judgments in 
the same manner as they evaluate the judgments of other auditors.
Farmer et al. (1987) show that an auditor is more likely to agree with managers’ 
financial-reporting preferences when the risk o f losing an engagement is high versus low. 
Trompeter (1994) finds that auditors who are compensated based on local-office
1 For a discussion, see J. Smith and T. Kida, "Heuristics and Biases: Expertise and Task Realism in 
Auditing," Psychological Bulletin 109:3, 1991, pp. 472-489. This paper contrasts research on biases in 
auditors’ judgments with similar research in psychology on biases in the judgments of other individuals. 
Smith and Kida conclude that auditors generally exhibit less bias or different types of bias than that found 
in general psychology research.
3
profitability are more likely to agree with clients’ preferences as GAAP becomes more 
subjective. Overall, this research suggests that auditors’ judgments are influenced by 
incentives to retain audit clients over time.
Other studies examine across-services incentives for obtaining or retaining non-audit 
(e.g., consulting) engagements for audit clients. For example, Emby and Davidson 
(1998) show that auditors’ judgments are influenced by client managers’ preferences for 
financial reporting when auditors provide non-audit services for the client. The effect of 
this factor is less when engagements involve specialized, as opposed to general, non-audit 
services. This result suggests that auditors are less susceptible to manager pressures 
when they possess greater economic power in their consulting arrangements with these 
clients.
2. Incentives and institutions that ameliorate impairments o f  auditor independence
Research documents several factors that mitigate the effects o f  factors that 
compromise auditor independence. These mitigating factors include environmental 
forces, such as litigation and reputation loss. These factors also encompass institutional 
arrangements within audit firms, including auditor rotation, the review process, peer 
review and compensation arrangements. Finally, some o f  the contracting parties at the 
entity whose financial reports are being audited, such as audit committees, also provide 
counterbalancing forces.
Several environmental forces mitigate the effects of incentives faced by auditors to 
compromise or impair their independence, including the possibility of reputation loss and 
the threat o f litigation or other similar sanctions.2 Individual auditors who face 
significant penalties if  they are caught having performed a defective audit have strong 
incentives to avoid defective audits.3 Research indicates that the risk o f litigation reduces 
the influence of manager preferences on auditors’ decisions and deters unethical behavior 
on the part of auditors (Farmer et al. 1987; Trompeter 1994; Shafer et al. 1999). Wilson 
and Grimlund (1990) also document that audit firms whose reputations have been 
impaired due to a SEC disciplinary action suffer losses in terms o f market share and 
client retention. These results indicate that environmental forces provide incentives for 
auditors to enhance their independence by developing and implementing organizational 
structures and processes related to independence.
Research has examined whether institutional arrangements within audit firms and the 
audit profession provide mitigating forces against threats to auditor independence. Tan 
(1995) finds that both auditor rotation and the hierarchical auditing review process reduce
2 Other environmental forces include strong self-regulatory mechanisms such as the Public Oversight 
Board, the Auditing Standards Board, and the Independence Standards Board.
3 The argument that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 reduced the penalties 
for bad audits depends on whether the pre-PSLRA environment was one of merit-based litigation or one of 
random losses imposed by a legal system where merit did not determine outcomes. Random
“enforcement” of rules would not be expected to induce compliance since the penalties are decided on 
bases other than breaking or adhering to the rules.
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auditors’ overemphasis on information that is consistent with their prior judgments. 
Similarly, Shafer et al. (1999) show that peer review deters unethical behavior on the part 
of auditors. Certain types of auditor compensation arrangements also appear to mitigate 
the effect o f incentives for client retention. Trompeter (1994) finds that auditors do not 
use the flexibility in GAAP to justify clients’ preferences when firm-wide, as opposed to 
local-office, profitability is emphasized in auditor compensation arrangements (large- 
pool compensation). Carcello et al. (2000) indicate that the type of compensation plan 
(small- versus large-pool) interacts with client size in determining the likelihood that an 
auditor issues a going concern opinion. These results suggest that audit firms’ 
compensation plans play a role in whether auditors compromise their professional 
judgment in light of pressure from corporate managers.
Certain corporate governance arrangements, such as the audit committee of the board 
of directors, also appear to mitigate forces that compromise auditor independence. 
McMullen (1996) documents that the presence of an audit committee is associated with 
lower auditor turnover involving an accounting disagreement. This finding suggests that 
the presence o f an audit committee enhances auditors’ ability to withstand pressure from 
client management.
Another governance arrangement that supports auditor independence is direct or 
indirect monitoring of the amount of non-auditing services provided by auditors. Parkash 
and Venable (1993) find that the amount o f recurring non-audit services purchased by 
audit clients varies with proxies for the level of agency costs between client managers 
and shareholders. Specifically, they find smaller purchases o f non-audit services from 
auditors when share ownership is dispersed and management owns a relatively lower 
percentage of stock. Firth (1997) documents a positive relation between the purchase of 
non-audit services from the auditor and ownership concentration (measured as director 
shareholdings and the percentage shareholding of the largest owner), implying that lower 
ownership concentrations—a proxy for agency costs—are associated with larger purchases 
o f non-audit services from auditors. These results suggest that either corporate managers 
or audit committees (or both) are sensitive to issues related to auditor independence when 
purchasing non-audit services from their auditors.
3. Benefits and Costs to Auditor Independence
Research has documented several benefits o f  higher quality audits, including reduced 
risk perceptions on the part o f  capital market participants and reduced earnings 
management on the part o f  corporate managers. The research uses general proxies fo r  
audit quality, which do not distinguish between the effects o f  auditor independence and 
auditor competence.
Recent survey evidence documents one potential cost to auditors’ independence. 
Specifically, this evidence suggests that placing restrictions on auditors’ provision o f  
non-audit services to audit clients may reduce auditor competence. The survey documents 
a decline in students majoring in accounting and attributes this decline in part to
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students’ perceptions that auditing provides a less-rewarding and challenging career 
than other careers such as consulting.
Several studies document benefits associated with higher audit quality, with audit 
quality typically defined in terms of CPA firm size or audit fees. Beatty (1989) 
documents that the degree o f underpricing in initial public offerings is lower when 
higher-priced (i.e., higher quality) auditors are associated with a company’s financial 
statements. Relatedly, Menon and Williams (1991) find that investment-banking fees 
charged for initial public offerings are lower for firms that employ national (Big Eight) 
auditing firms. Results of both of these studies suggest that market participants attribute 
less risk to firms audited by large CPA firms. Becker et al. (1998) find that clients of Big 
Six auditing firms exhibit smaller amounts of income-increasing earnings management 
than companies audited by non-Big Six auditing firms. Although these studies document 
benefits of audits provided by higher quality CPA firms, the proxies used for auditor 
quality are imprecise and do not distinguish whether the higher quality o f large CPA 
firms is due to greater independence or greater competence.
A recent study published by the American Accounting Association suggests that a 
potential cost of increasing auditor independence via restriction of certain activities is a 
reduction in the competence o f persons choosing the auditing profession.4 This study 
shows that the accounting profession currently faces problems acquiring high quality 
professional employees. Specifically, the study indicates that the number o f accounting 
graduates (per year) has decreased approximately 25% from 1995-96 to 1998-99. 
Additionally, 80% of educators and 46% of practitioners believe that accounting students 
are currently less qualified than in the past. Educators and practitioners attribute this 
decline primarily to two factors: (1) the relatively lower starting salaries in accounting 
compared to other business disciplines such as information systems and finance and (2) 
students’ perceptions that accounting is less challenging and rewarding than other fields 
of study. Approximately 90% of the practitioners and accounting educators surveyed in 
the study strongly agree that consulting work in CPA firms is viewed as challenging and 
rewarding; however, only about 60% of these two groups strongly agree that audit 
services in a CPA firm are challenging and rewarding. Thus, improving auditor 
independence by imposing restrictions on auditors’ provision o f consulting services may 
further reduce the quality of students who choose employment at CPA firms.
4. Users’ perceptions o f  auditor independence
In general, financial statements users express greater concerns about auditor 
independence than do auditors. Research suggests that these differences are related in 
part to experience and knowledge differences between users and auditors. Research has 
focused on effects o f  one specific factor that may compromise independence, the 
provision o f  non-audit services to audit clients, on users’ perceptions o f  auditor 
independence. Results o f  this research generally suggest that financial statement users
4 See W. S. Albrecht and R. J. Sack, Accounting Education: Charting the Course Through a Perilous 
Future, Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, 2000.
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believe relatively small amounts o f  consulting services have little effect on auditor 
independence and increase auditor competence. Separation o f  the audit s ta ff from the 
sta ff performing consulting services also increases the perceived independence o f  
auditors.
Several studies show that financial statement users express greater concern than do 
auditors that factors such as competition, the provision of non-audit services, and 
incentives to retain clients negatively affect auditor independence (Shockley 1981; 
Reckers and Stagliano 1981; Firth 1980).5 This result may be due in part to users’ lower 
levels o f knowledge about the auditing profession and the audit environment. For 
example, Reckers and Stagliano (1981) find that a larger percentage of MBA students 
express concerns about auditor independence than do financial analysts. Analysis in 
Shockley (1981) indicates that partners in Big Eight CPA firms have more complex 
mental models for evaluating auditor independence than the mental models of 
commercial loan officers and financial analysts. Thus, some financial statement users’ 
concerns about auditor independence may reflect a lack of understanding of the checks 
and balances in the audit environment, regardless o f whether the issue is over-time or 
cross-sectional threats to independence.6
Results o f research on users’ perceptions of the effect of non-audit services on auditor 
independence suggest that various factors mitigate users’ concerns about compromised 
auditor independence. For example, several studies show that users perceive little 
impairment in auditor independence when the amount of non-auditing services provided 
to clients is small (Lowe and Pany 1995; 1996). Studies indicate that users perceive that 
small amounts o f non-audit service enhance, rather than reduce, audit quality (McKinley 
et al. 1985; Pany and Reckers 1988). Additionally, the use o f separate staffs for 
providing audit and non-audit services reduces users’ concerns about auditor 
independence (Lowe and Pany 1995). Overall, these results are consistent with the idea 
that users believe that there are positive synergies between auditing and consulting.
Users perceive the benefits o f these positive synergies to exceed negative effects on 
independence as long as the consulting fees are not material to an individual office, and 
audit and non-audit services are provided by different individuals within the firm.
5 Much of the research on financial statement users’ perceptions of the effect of non-audit services on 
auditor independence was conducted during the 1980s, a time period in which the level of non-audit 
services provided was less than that provided in the 1990s. The results of these older studies should be 
evaluated in light of this limitation.
6 These results for financial statement users are consistent with research on the psychology of attitude 
formation. Psychology research finds that peoples’ beliefs about groups to which they do not belong (e.g., 
college students’ beliefs about senior citizens) are less complex than their beliefs about groups to which 
they do belong (e.g., college students beliefs’ about other college students). These simpler belief structures 
lead to more extreme beliefs for out-groups than in-groups (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 120; Linville 1982).
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Responses to questions posed in the Exposure Draft
Q1 The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom
from  those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be 
expected to compromise, an auditors ’ ability to make unbiased audit decisions. ” 
Is this definition appropriate? I f  not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
We believe that the definition should be modified to state “freedom from the 
effects o f those pressures and other factors that can compromise.. ." The 
definition as stated implies the absence o f factors that significantly compromise 
an auditor’s ability to make unbiased decisions. This approach is inconsistent with 
subsequent portions o f the Exposure Draft’s conceptual framework, specifically 
the independence risk model in which threats to auditor independence can be 
mitigated by safeguards. The Committee’s modification to the definition of 
auditor independence incorporates the idea underlying the independence risk 
model, i.e., that safeguards can mitigate the effects o f independence threats on 
auditors’ ability to make unbiased decisions.
We agree with the definition’s focus on auditors’ decision making and on 
observable factors that can influence auditors’ decisions, as indicated in points 4 
and 7 in our discussion o f the conceptual basis for a framework for auditor 
independence. However, as noted above, the Exposure Draft’s definition does not 
reflect the idea that safeguards can mitigate threats. Since both threats and 
safeguards are observable factors (at least to certain groups), the Committee 
believes that the definition of auditor independence should reflect the effects of 
both threats and safeguards, consistent with point 7 o f our discussion of the 
conceptual basis for a framework for auditor independence.
We also agree with the inclusion o f the clause “or can reasonably be expected to 
compromise” in the definition o f auditor independence. This clause reflects the 
Committee’s view (point 3 o f our discussion of the conceptual basis for a 
framework for auditor independence) that the benefits o f auditor independence 
depend on the perceptions of individuals who rely on auditors’ decisions. For the 
benefits of independence to accrue, it is not sufficient that auditors are unaffected 
by factors that may compromise unbiased decisions; reasonable users who rely on 
auditor judgments must also perceive that such factors do not compromise 
auditors’ decisions. Additionally, the inclusion of the word “reasonably” in the 
definition is consistent with research indicating that financial statement users’ 
views about auditor independence depend on their knowledge about auditors and 
the audit environment. Financial statement users can have unreasonable beliefs 
about auditor independence for two reasons: either they are not fully informed or 
they fail to process information rationally. The Committee suggests the 
possibility that the group most likely to avoid both conditions is corporate audit 
committees, because o f their expertise and access to information.
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While we agree with the inclusion of the words “reasonably expected” in this 
clause, we disagree with the Exposure Draft’s approach for assessing “reasonable 
expectations.” As indicated in paragraph 56 of the Exposure Draft, the ISB plans 
to incorporate users’ views by soliciting comments from users, while formulating 
standards based on the ISB’s evaluation o f these views and the ISB's judgment 
about how to best meet the goal of auditor independence. While this approach 
may be appropriate for the ISB, it limits the applicability of the conceptual 
framework for other groups who are not in a position to solicit users’ views. The 
Committee proposes that the Exposure Draft take the second approach stated in 
paragraph 56, that of incorporating the viewpoint of fully informed financial 
statement users, such as audit committee members. The approach stated in the 
Exposure Draft (i.e., having the ISB solicit users’ views) can be viewed as the 
method by which the ISB implements this second approach. Other independence 
decision makers, such corporate audit committees, may choose other methods, 
such as using their professional judgment as a surrogate for reasonable views of 
financial statement users.
Q2 The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal o f  auditor independence
is “to support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance 
capital market efficiency. ”
Is this goal appropriate? I f  not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
In general, we believe that this goal is appropriate. This goal is consistent with 
both the Committee’s view (stated in point 5 of our discussion of the conceptual 
basis for a framework for auditor independence) and research indicating that 
auditor quality (competence and independence) influences capital markets 
participants' assessments of the risk of investments. We believe, however, that 
the goal should emphasize more strongly that auditor independence is important 
for all users of financial statements (including, for example, creditors, employees, 
suppliers). While the focus on investors in the capital markets is consistent with 
the mission of the ISB as stated in paragraph 42 of the Exposure Draft, an 
emphasis on multiple users of financial statements will broaden the applicability 
o f the conceptual framework.
Q3 The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles related to four
concepts o f  auditor independence: threats, safeguards, independence risk, and 
significance o f  threats/effectiveness o f  safeguards. The concepts and basic 
principles contained in the proposed framework are intended to serve as 
guidelines fo r  independence decision makers to analyze and resolve independence 
issues.
Are the concepts and basic principles appropriate and sufficiently operational? I f  
not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
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We agree with the concepts of threats to auditor independence and safeguards 
against those threats. These concepts are consistent with both the Committee’s 
view (expressed in point 7 o f our discussion o f the conceptual basis for a 
framework for auditor independence) and empirical accounting research. 
Specifically, research documents that at least two of the threats listed in the 
Exposure Draft (self-interest threats and self-review threats) can influence 
auditors’ judgments. Research also supports the efficacy of various factors that 
mitigate these threats, including factors in both categories listed in paragraph 14 
of the Exposure Draft. We also agree that independence threats and safeguards 
combine to determine independence risk, as noted in the definition of 
independence risk. We comment on the Exposure Draft’s independence risk 
model in Q4 below.
Q4 Paragraphs 49-53 describe the elements o f  a risk model fo r  auditor independence 
in which independence risk is a function o f  the significance o f  threats to auditor 
independence and the effectiveness o f  safeguards to auditor independence.
What are your views on the appropriateness o f  the independence risk model? Is 
there research that the Board should be made aware o f  that would be helpful in 
expanding the model or otherwise making it more useful fo r  independence 
decision makers? I f  so, please describe that research.
As noted in the response to Q3, we agree with the concepts underlying the 
independence risk model, i.e., that independence threats and safeguards combine 
to determine independence risk. We believe that the independence risk model 
would be more useful for independence decision makers if  it were stated with 
greater specification, using an approach similar to that for audit risk. In the audit 
risk model, audit risk is typically viewed as a multiplicative function o f inherent 
risk, control risk, and detection risk (SAS No. 47). Similarly, the independence 
risk model can be viewed as a multiplicative function o f two risks: the risk that 
threats to independence exist and the risk that safeguards do not eliminate these 
risks.
This approach would separate the assessment of the probability that unmitigated 
threats to independence exist from the assessment of the implications o f such 
unmitigated threats. In the Exposure Draft, the assessment o f the probability of 
an unmitigated threat (i.e., independence risk) is confounded with the assessment 
o f the magnitude of the impact of the unmitigated threat. For example, paragraph 
19 defines the significance o f a threat to auditor independence as “the extent to 
which the threat increases independence risk.” While this definition appears to 
relate to assessing the probability that the threat will affect independence, 
examples in paragraph 19 of factors that affect the significance of a threat include 
items that influence the magnitude o f the consequence o f the threat, not the 
probability o f the threat. For example, “the importance o f the matter that is the 
subject of the activity” relates more to assessing the magnitude of the effect o f a 
threat than to assessing the probability that a threat exists.
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Accordingly, we recommend that the independence risk model separate the 
assessment of the probability that unmitigated threats to independence affect an 
auditor’s ability to make unbiased decisions from the assessment o f the magnitude 
of effects o f these unmitigated threats. The first assessment would emulate the 
audit risk model, defining independence risk as a multiplicative function of the 
risk that threats to independence exist and the risk that existing safeguards do not 
eliminate these threats. The magnitude of consequences associated with threats 
that are not fully mitigated would then be assessed separately. The expected 
impact o f independence risk would then be estimated by multiplying the 
independence risk probability by the estimated magnitude of consequences.
Such an approach allows for a cost/benefit evaluation of safeguards that mitigate 
independence threats. For example, if  no safeguards currently exist, the cost of a 
threat to independence is the probability of the threat multiplied by the magnitude 
of the consequences o f the threat. This cost can also be viewed as the benefit that 
would accrue if a safeguard totally eliminates the threat. This benefit could be 
compared against the cost of implementing the safeguard.
We realize that it may be infeasible to specify values for parameters of the model 
in specific situations; i.e., it may be difficult to estimate the probability that a 
particular safeguard will mitigate a threat to auditor independence or to assess the 
magnitude o f consequences of such a threat. However, we believe that the 
structure of this model will enhance individuals’ ability to evaluate auditor 
independence by specifying the different constructs that relate to effects of 
deviations from auditor independence.
We agree with the focus in paragraph 30 of the Exposure Draft related to 
considering the views o f users of financial reports and other individuals who rely 
on auditor decisions. As indicated previously (point 3 o f our discussion of the 
conceptual basis for a framework for auditor independence and our response to 
Q 1), the views of reasonable financial statement users are important to assessing 
the likelihood that threats to independence exist and the probability that 
safeguards fail to eliminate this threat. Additionally, consequences to individuals 
who rely on auditors’ judgments will be a significant part of the assessment o f 
consequences of independence risk.
Q5 Are there other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual framework that 
the Board should consider? I f  so, what are those issues, and how would you 
advise the Board to resolve them?
As indicated in the first section of this comment letter, the Committee believes 
the Exposure Draft’s conceptual framework does not incorporate two important 
elements. First, we believe the Exposure Draft should explicitly include the view 
that the entity whose financial reports are the subject o f the audit is not a 
natural person with one state o f mind, but rather is composed o f multiple groups 
of contracting parties (point 2 of our discussion of the conceptual basis for a
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framework for auditor independence). Separating an audit client into its various 
groups (e.g., management, audit committee) should aid in the identification of 
threats to auditor independence that are created by auditors’ interactions with 
these various groups. Similarly, this approach should aid in evaluating the 
effectiveness of safeguards to threats to auditor independence. For example, 
auditors’ interactions with management are likely to result in threats to auditor 
independence, while auditors’ interactions with the company’s audit committee 
are likely to mitigate some of these threats.
Second, the Committee believes that the framework should incorporate more 
explicitly the idea that audit quality is a function o f both auditor independence 
and auditor competence, and that achieving high levels o f auditor independence 
can have negative effects on audit firms’ ability to obtain high levels of 
competence in its human capital. While the Exposure Draft refers 
to such “second-order” effects in paragraph 29, the Committee believes these 
effects are not given sufficient prominence. In the Committee’s opinion, these 
“second-order” effects are at least as important as the “first-order” costs of 
developing and implementing safeguards because the second-order effects can 
result in the failure to achieve the overall goal o f auditor independence, i.e., 
higher quality audits. We believe that auditor independence cannot be evaluated 
separately from auditor competence given the interactions between the two. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the interactive effects of auditor independence 
and auditor competence be explicitly addressed in the conceptual framework.
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Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
RE: ED 00-2, A Conceptual Framework fo r  Auditors Independence
Dear Mr. Siegel:
The Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)1 is pleased to comment on the 
Independence Standards Board’s Exposure Draft, A Conceptual Framework fo r  Auditors Independence 
(ED). The Audit Subcommittee of the AIMR U.S. Advocacy Committee (AIMR Committee)2 offers its 
comments below.
General Comments
The AIMR Committee commends the Board on it efforts to establish a conceptual framework for 
auditors’ independence. As mentioned in our previous comment letter3, such a framework is essential 
in the development of principles-based set of standards for auditor independence and must provide for 
the following:
1) direction and structure for the Board for promulgating sound and consistent standards of 
independence, as well as resolving independence issues and questions;
2) guidance to those making decisions regarding auditor independence in absence of ISB 
standards and other independence rules;
3) assurance to stakeholders that auditors’ independence is being maintained; and
4) boundaries for debate and discussions of issues related to auditor independence between 
stakeholders and the Board in developing, or enhancing, auditor independence standards.
The Association for Investment Management and Research is a global, nonprofit organization of over 48,000 investment professionals 
from over 90 countries. Through its headquarters in the U.S. and more than 100 Member Societies and Member Chapters throughout the 
world AIMR provides global leadership in investment education, professional standards, and advocacy programs.
2 The U.S. Advocacy Committee is a standing committee of AIMR charged with responding to new regulatory, legislative, and other 
developments in the United States affecting the efficiencies of U.S. financial markets.
3 Comment letter addressed to Arthur Siegel, Executive Director at ISB, regarding Discussion Memorandum 00-1, A Conceptual 
Framework for Auditors Independence, dated June 1, 2000.
Setting a Higher Standard for Investment Professionals WorldwideSM
Mr. Arthur Siegel
ED 00-2, A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
06 March 2001
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We believe that external auditors, who are independent and objective, play a critical role in 
maintaining the credibility of the financial information disseminated and used by market participants in 
making informed investment decisions. Consequently, independent auditors are integral to the overall 
stability and strength of these markets. Moreover, credible and reliable information is essential for the 
efficient operation of financial capital markets, insuring that capital will be allocated to those 
investments that create the greatest returns commensurate with the risks and uncertainties of the 
investments. The ability to discern these risks and uncertainties has become critical (as well as 
difficult) for users of financial statements because more measurements and valuations are based on 
management’s subjectivity and discretion. Thus, an objective opinion of an independent auditor is 
paramount, especially in regards to the reliability of these valuations and adequacy of the related 
disclosures.
Comments of Specific Issues
Definition of Auditor Independence
W e  believe that the following proposed definition should be modified to be more explicit about the 
perception of independence -
Auditor independence is freedom from  those pressures and other factors that compromise, or 
can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor's ability to make unbiased audit 
decisions.
The wording of the definition should be more consistent with the concept of independence noted in the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s recent revision of auditor independent requirements. The 
revised rule state that an auditor is not independent i f  a reasonable investor, with knowledge o f all 
relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that the auditor is not capable o f exercising 
objective and impartial judgment. We believe that this consistency will make the ISB’s definition of 
auditor independence congruent with the SEC’s concept of independence noted above.
Goal of Auditor Independence
We agree strongly with the proposed goal of auditor independence, which emphasizes the user’s 
reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency. However, we 
recommend that “users” identified in paragraph 8 of the proposed framework be expanded to include 
the independent members of an enterprise’s board of directors, in particular, members of the audit 
committee. Those board members are responsible for both the governance of the enterprise and the 
financial statements presented to the public. Thus, they also must rely on the auditor’s opinions, as 
well as the representations made by management, in making decisions about corporate governance, 
including whether to engage or terminate relationships with the audit firm.
Mr. Arthur Siegel
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Auditor Independence Concepts
We believe that the following concepts are necessary components of an effective framework for 
auditor independence: (1) threats to auditor independence; (2) safeguards to auditor independence; (3) 
independence risk; and (4) significance of threats and effectiveness of safeguards.
■ Threats to Auditor Independence -  We recommend that the “perception” of whether 
independence is impaired be incorporated into the definition of threats to auditor 
independence. Additionally, we believe that the illustrative examples of threats to auditor 
independence provide good guidance for assessing whether auditor independence is 
impaired by the following threats: (1) self-interest; (2) self-review; (3) advocacy; (4) 
familiarity (or trust); and (5) intimidation. Therefore, this guidance should remain a part of 
the conceptual framework.
■ Safeguards to Auditor Independence -  We agree with the proposed definition of 
safeguards. In addition to the seven safeguards noted under paragraph 14(a), we 
recommend that disclosure of current (as well as pending) relationships between the audit 
firm and its audit client should be included as a safeguard. Such a disclosure was 
considered necessary information by 84% of 970 respondents (who are analysts and 
portfolio managers) surveyed by AIMR in August 2000.
■ Independence Risk - We agree with the proposed definition of independence risk. The 
independence risk is expressed as a point on a continuum that ranges from no independence 
risk to maximum independence risk. However, we suggest that the conceptual framework 
include some guidance as to what level of risk is appropriate once all threats to 
independence and safeguards utilized to mitigate these threats have been analyzed and 
assessed. In other words, define the acceptable level of risk or provide some guidance in 
determining the acceptable level of risk.
■ Significance of Threats and Effectiveness of Safeguards -  We agree with the proposed 
definitions for the significance of threats and effectiveness of safeguards. A thorough 
assessment of independence risk must include an analysis of the types of threats and 
safeguards affecting independence. This analysis should consider the degree of severity or 
significance of the actual or potential threats to auditor independence offset by those 
safeguards that effectively mitigate or eliminate the effect of the identified threats.
Principles of Auditor Independence
We believe that underlying principles are essential in developing an effective code of standards for 
professional conduct. Three of the four principles identified in the ED are appropriate -  (1) assessing 
the level of independence risk, (2) determining the acceptability of the level of independence risk, and 
(3) considering the views of investors and other interested parties when auditor independence issues 
are addressed. We believe that the latter principle is essential to assess properly the integrity (as well as
perceived integrity) of the financial statements and other information disseminated to the public, who 
use this information to make investment decisions.
However, we have concerns about the principle relating to the benefits and costs associated with 
imposing safeguards to reduce independence risk. In particular, the example discussed in paragraph 29 
to explain costs that would likely exceed benefits, or compromise the quality of the audit. The example 
provided indicates that audit quality would be impaired if certain safeguards such as restrictions or 
prohibitions were imposed, relating to investment in audit clients or employment relationships between 
family members of the auditor and its audit client. Audit quality under these circumstances would be 
diminished because the audit firm would have more difficulty in attracting employees.
We believe that the above example is flawed because it is not specific about the investments or 
employment relationships. Certain investments and employment relationships should be prohibited or 
restricted due to their nature and the level of risk they pose to auditor independence, regardless of the 
cost. In a recent AIMR survey on auditor independence, 875 respondents (analysts and portfolio 
managers) answered the following question: Should an audit firm, its partners or audit professional 
staff be permitted to have financial ownership or financial interest in the firm 's audit client?
o 85% of the respondents answered that audit firms should have no ownership or financial 
interest in the audit client.
o 86% of the respondents answered that partners of the audit firm, who are involved in the 
audit engagement, should have no ownership or financial interest in the audit client.
o 76% of the respondents answered that professional staff of the audit firm, who are involved 
in the audit engagement, should have no ownership or financial interest in the audit client.
Concluding Remarks
The AIMR Committee commends the Board on its efforts to promulgate effective auditor 
independence standards. We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on this Exposure Draft 
regarding a conceptual framework for auditor independence. Should you have any questions or need 
elaboration with regards to the Committee’s comments, please do not hesitate to contact Georgene 
Palacky at 804.951.5334 or gbp@aimr.org.
Mr. Arthur Siegel
ED 00-2, A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
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Sincerely,
Georgene B. Palacky, CPA 
Associate, Advocacy 
AIMR Advocacy Program
DeWitt Bowman, CFA
Chair, Audit Subcommittee 
AIMR Advocacy Advisory Committee
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A r t h u r  A n d e r s e n
Arthur Andersen LLP
225 North Michigan Avenue
March 7 , 2001 Chicago IL 60601-7600
Tel 312 782 0225
Independence Standards Board Fax 312 507 2548
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED 00-2
Gentlemen:
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your request for comments on Exposure Draft 00-2 
(ED 00-2), A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence. The following are our responses to 
key questions raised in the ED.
Definition of Auditor Independence
Auditor independence is defined as "freedom from those pressures and other factors that 
compromise, or could be reasonably expected to compromise, the auditor's ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions." This definition implies an absolute standard of "freedom" that could 
never be met. Recognizing this, the ED in the sentence immediately following the definition 
contradicts the definition by noting that there is no intention to imply the auditor must be free 
of all pressures. The discussion continues by noting that it is only those factors that are "so 
significant" that they could reasonably be expected to impair the auditor's objectivity.
We would suggest the definition be modified to acknowledge, as the ED does in the discussion, 
that auditor independence does not require freedom from all influences. The definition should 
stress that independence is an absence of influences that create an unacceptable risk of bias.
Goal of Auditor Independence
We agree that the goal of auditor independence is to support user reliance on the financial 
reporting process. Although it is not unreasonable to claim that this goal would in turn 
contribute to market efficiency, the profession's duties relate more immediately to reliable 
financial reporting.
Concepts and Basic Principles of Auditor Independence
These sections of the ED provide a useful discussion of the concept of and basic principles 
relating to independence. Paragraph 19 discusses the significance of threats to auditor 
independence, noting that a specific threat depends on many factors. Although there is a 
reference to "the importance" of the matter, we believe the notion of "materiality" of the matter
should be included. In some cases, the relationship or matter may give rise to one of the threats 
identified in paragraph 12, yet because the relationship or matter is immaterial, an unacceptable 
risk to independence does not exist. The concept of materiality should be recognized as a 
threshold issue when considering the threats to independence.
Other Issues
In paragraph 1.d., the word 'boundary' implies that future discussions of independence will be 
limited by the Framework's content. We do not believe this is the intent, or will be the effect, of 
the final Framework.
In conclusion, we support the Board in its efforts, and believe that the structure and content of 
the Framework will be very useful. If you should you have any questions on our comments, 
please feel free to call Charles A. Horstmann at (312) 507-3071 or Jean L. Rothbarth at (312) 507- 
2827.
Sincerely,
February 28, 2001
Independence Standards Board 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 00-2
Gentlemen:
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The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is pleased to submit 
this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 00-2, 
Statement o f  Independence Concepts -  A Conceptual Framework fo r  Auditor 
Independence.
With regard to the specific questions outlined in the Exposure Draft, we have the 
following comments:
1. The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom 
from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be 
expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” 
As noted in our response to DM 00-1, we believe that the definition of auditor 
independence should be risk-based and include a materiality or unacceptable risk 
threshold. We also believe that the phrase “freedom from  pressures and other 
factors" included in the definition is too absolute and could seldom be achieved. 
We recommend that the Board consider using the phrase “absence o f  influences" 
which we believe better reflects the concept of independence.
Accordingly, we recommend an independence definition as follows:
Auditor independence is an absence o f  influences that create an 
unacceptable risk o f  bias with respect to an auditor’s ability to make 
audit decisions.
2. The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal of auditor independence 
is “to support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance 
capital market efficiency.”
We believe that the enhanced reliability of audited financial information is the 
primary value of the audit and that such reliability enhances the efficiency of the 
capital markets. The enhancement of capital market efficiency is an indirect result 
o f enhancing the reliability of audited financial information.
We recommend that the Board revise the goal to refer to capital market 
effectiveness instead of efficiency since effectiveness is a broader term and 
captures the concept of efficiency.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 • (201) 938-3000 • (212) 318-0500 • fax (201) 938-3329 • www.a 
ISO 9001 Certified
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3. The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles related to four 
concepts o f auditor independence: threats, safeguards, independence risk, and 
significance of threats/effectiveness of safeguards. We believe that these concepts 
are appropriate and generally agree with the basic principles except as specifically 
stated below.
The second basic principle (par. 24) states that “Independence decision makers 
should determine whether the level o f  independence risk is at an acceptable 
position on the independence risk continuum.'' Paragraph 26 further states that:
Some threats to auditor independence may affect only certain individuals 
or groups within an auditing firm, and the significance o f  some threats 
may be different fo r  different individuals or groups. To ensure that 
independence risk is at an acceptably low level, independence decision 
makers should identify the individuals or groups affected by threats to 
auditor independence and the significance o f  those threats. Different 
types o f  safeguards may be appropriate fo r  different individuals and 
groups depending on their roles in the audit.
We agree that independence decision makers should consider which individuals 
within the firm are specifically affected by one or more threats to independence 
and the types of safeguards that may be appropriate to mitigate or eliminate such 
threats. However, we strongly recommend that the Board include a separate basic 
principle that specifically incorporates an engagement-focused approach to 
independence. The Board has already introduced this concept in ISB Standard No. 
2 and embraced it in its project on Financial Interests and Family Relationships. 
The SEC has also embraced this approach in its recent rulemaking and the PEEC 
is in the process of modernizing the AICPA’s independence rules along those 
same lines. We agree that the threats to independence are strongest for those 
individuals who serve on the audit engagement team and to some extent, to those 
individuals who are otherwise in a position to influence the audit. Many other 
individuals pose little or no threat to independence and can be subject to recusal 
or consultation within the firm and accordingly, need not be subject to 
independence restrictions. Independence decision makers would benefit if  the 
framework supported this approach through the inclusion of a separate basic 
principle.
Another component that we strongly believe should be included in a conceptual 
framework is the concept of materiality. The framework should explicitly 
recognize the importance of materiality as a threshold consideration in 
determining whether an auditor could resist a potential threat to his or her 
independence. The present implicit approach to addressing this through a 
combination of threats and safeguards is too subtle and we believe would be 
ineffective in conveying this important concept. Accordingly, we recommend 
that the Board include a basic principle such as the following:
2
Immaterial activities or relationships between individuals in an audit firm  
(as well as the firm  itse lf and an audit client should be presumed not to 
impair independence, absent evidence to the contrary.
4. We support the elements of the risk model for auditor independence as described 
in paragraphs 49-53 of the proposed conceptual framework and believe that the 
proposed risk model is appropriate. We are not aware o f other relevant research 
to bring to your attention.
5. We are not aware o f any other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual 
framework that the Board should consider.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in 
further detail these comments and any other matters with respect to the Board’s 
Exposure Draft.
Sincerely,
James L. Curry
Chair
PEEC
cc: Susan Coffey, Vice President
Self Regulation and SECPS
Lisa Snyder, Director 
Professional Ethics Division
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Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 00-2
Gentlemen:
The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is pleased to submit 
this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 00-2, 
Statement o f  Independence Concepts -  A Conceptual Framework fo r  Auditor 
Independence.
With regard to the specific questions outlined in the Exposure Draft, we have the 
following comments:
1. The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom 
from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be 
expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” 
As noted in our response to DM 00-1, we believe that the definition of auditor 
independence should be risk-based and include a materiality or unacceptable risk 
threshold. We also believe that the phrase '‘freedom from  pressures and other 
factors” included in the definition is too absolute and could seldom be achieved. 
We recommend that the Board consider using the phrase “absence o f  influences” 
which we believe better reflects the concept of independence.
Accordingly, we recommend an independence definition as follows:
Auditor independence is an absence o f influences that create an 
unacceptable risk o f  bias with respect to an auditor’s ability to make 
audit decisions.
2. The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal of auditor independence 
is “to support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance 
capital market efficiency.”
We believe that the enhanced reliability o f audited financial information is the 
primary value o f the audit and that such reliability enhances the efficiency of the 
capital markets. The enhancement of capital market efficiency is an indirect result 
o f enhancing the reliability o f audited financial information.
We recommend that the Board revise the goal to refer to capital market 
effectiveness instead of efficiency since effectiveness is a broader term and 
captures the concept of efficiency.
3. The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles related to four 
concepts o f auditor independence: threats, safeguards, independence risk, and 
significance of threats/effectiveness of safeguards. We believe that these concepts 
are appropriate and generally agree with the basic principles except as specifically 
stated below.
The second basic principle (par. 24) states that “Independence decision makers 
should determine whether the level o f  independence risk is at an acceptable 
position on the independence risk continuum.” Paragraph 26 further states that:
Some threats to auditor independence may affect only certain individuals 
or groups within an auditing firm, and the significance o f  some threats 
may be different fo r  different individuals or groups. To ensure that 
independence risk is at an acceptably low level, independence decision 
makers should identify the individuals or groups affected by threats to 
auditor independence and the significance o f  those threats. Different 
types o f  safeguards may be appropriate fo r  different individuals and 
groups depending on their roles in the audit.
We agree that independence decision makers should consider which individuals 
within the firm are specifically affected by one or more threats to independence 
and the types of safeguards that may be appropriate to mitigate or eliminate such 
threats. However, we strongly recommend that the Board include a separate basic 
principle that specifically incorporates an engagement-focused approach to 
independence. The Board has already introduced this concept in ISB Standard No. 
2 and embraced it in its project on Financial Interests and Family Relationships. 
The SEC has also embraced this approach in its recent rulemaking and the PEEC 
is in the process of modernizing the AICPA’s independence rules along those 
same lines. We agree that the threats to independence are strongest for those 
individuals who serve on the audit engagement team and to some extent, to those 
individuals who are otherwise in a position to influence the audit. Many other 
individuals pose little or no threat to independence and can be subject to recusal 
or consultation within the firm and accordingly, need not be subject to 
independence restrictions. Independence decision makers would benefit if  the 
framework supported this approach through the inclusion o f a separate basic 
principle.
Another component that we strongly believe should be included in a conceptual 
framework is the concept o f materiality. The framework should explicitly 
recognize the importance o f materiality as a threshold consideration in 
determining whether an auditor could resist a potential threat to his or her 
independence. The present implicit approach to addressing this through a 
combination of threats and safeguards is too subtle and we believe would be 
ineffective in conveying this important concept. Accordingly, we recommend 
that the Board include a basic principle such as the following:
2
Immaterial activities or relationships between individuals in an audit firm  
(as well as the firm  itself) and an audit client should be presumed not to 
impair independence, absent evidence to the contrary.
4. We support the elements of the risk model for auditor independence as described 
in paragraphs 49-53 of the proposed conceptual framework and believe that the 
proposed risk model is appropriate. We are not aware o f other relevant research 
to bring to your attention.
5. We are not aware o f any other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual 
framework that the Board should consider.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in 
further detail these comments and any other matters with respect to the Board’s 
Exposure Draft.
Sincerely,
James L. Curry
Chair
PEEC
cc: Susan Coffey, Vice President
Self Regulation and SECPS
Lisa Snyder, Director 
Professional Ethics Division
3
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Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft, Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor 
Independence
Attn: ED 00-2
Dear Mr. Siegel:
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, the oldest state accounting 
association, represents 29,500 CPAs whose audit firms will be affected by the eventual outcomes 
of the independence standards setting process addressed in the conceptual framework. We are 
pleased to submit the attached comments regarding Independence Standards Board conceptual 
framework exposure draft. With this letter I am transmitting the comments of the Auditing 
Standards and Procedures Committee; the comments of the Professional Ethics Committee will 
be sent to you separately. We appreciate the opportunity to express our beliefs concerning this 
important exposure draft.
Please contact William Stocker, chair of the Auditing Standards and Procedures 
Committee at (212) 503 - 8875, or Robert H. Colson, NYSSCPA Staff, at (212) 719-8350 if you 
require further information.
Very truly yours,
P. Gerard Sokolski, CPA 
President
NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Comments on
Independence Standards Board 
Exposure Draft
Statement of Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework 
for Auditor Independence 
ED 00-2
March 16, 2001
Principal Drafter
William Stocker, CPA, Chair 
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee
NYSSCPA
2000-2001 Accounting and Auditing General Committee
Brian A. Caswell (Chair) 
Thomas O. Linder 
William M. Stocker, III 
Paul J. Wendell
Susan M. Barossi 
Robert M. Sattler 
Paul D. Warner
John F. Georger, Jr. 
Robert E. Sohr 
Robert N. Waxman
NYSSCPA
2000 - 2001 Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee
William M. Stocker, Chair Helen R. Liang Thomas Sorrentino
Romolo Roberto Calvi Joseph E. Manfre Jonathan Brett Taylor
Vincent Gabriel Lawrence E. Nalitt William H. Walters
Fred R. Goldstein Wayne A. Nast Paul D. Warner
Neal B. Hitzig Bruce H. Nearon Barry Wexler
Julian E. Jacoby R. Michael Peress Margaret A. Wood
Jerry Marting Klein John J. Piccinnini
NYSSCPA Staff
Robert H. Colson
NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
Comments on
Independence Standards Board 
Exposure Draft
Statement of Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework 
for Auditor Independence 
ED 00-2
Comments of the Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee
The Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee agreed to express it concerns about 
three issues related to the effects on auditors of adopting the Exposure Draft as a conceptual 
framework. The Committee understands that not all aspects of these issues are completely 
controlled by ISB, but believe that ISB should address them in their final statement.
Extension of Conceptual Framework to Broader Independence Issues
It became apparent to the committee during the course of its discussion that its members 
had implicitly assumed that the application of the conceptual framework would go beyond the 
auditors of SEC registrants, in spite of ISB’s officially restricted scope. At the conceptual 
framework level, it will be difficult to sustain distinctions between concepts that apply differently 
to SEC registrants and non-registrants. Moreover, conceptual distinctions of this nature would be 
difficult to explain to the public.
Appropriate Treatment of Independence Safeguards
The committee discussed briefly the three elements of the conceptual framework related 
to definitions, goals, and threats. However, its discussion on safeguards revealed several 
concerns:
• The committee agreed that, regardless of ISB’s possible desires to restrict the use of 
the conceptual framework to its own deliberations, it would be inevitable that audit 
firms would also use it for guidance and for formulating their independence 
compliance programs. In this context, many members expressed a concern that 
placing “safeguards” at the same level as “threats” in the conceptual framework 
would lead firms to pay less attention to threats to independence because of the 
(possibly over confident or mistaken) reliance on the existence of an adequate 
safeguard for every threat.
• Several members suggested that safeguards would be more appropriately handled as 
an element of the cost/benefit analysis later in the conceptual framework.
• Others indicated their belief that safeguards should not be specifically addressed in 
the conceptual framework.
Appearance of Independence
The committee concluded that the conceptual framework was helpful in their discussions 
related to independence in fact. However, they concluded that the conceptual framework does 
not adequately provide guidance with respect to the appearance of independence. They believe 
that appearance of independence should be more explicitly defined and discussed in the 
conceptual framework, especially in light of the SEC’s recent rulemaking, which focuses almost 
exclusively on appearance of independence.
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Mr. Arthur Siegel  
Executive Director  
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft, Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor 
Independence
Attn: ED 00-2
Dear Mr. Siegel:
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, the oldest state accounting 
association, represents 29,500 CPAs whose audit firms will be affected by the eventual outcomes 
of the independence standards setting process addressed in the conceptual framework. We are 
pleased to submit the attached comments regarding Independence Standards Board conceptual 
framework exposure draft. With this letter I am transmitting the comments of the Professional 
Ethics Committee; the comments of the Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee will be 
sent to you separately. We appreciate the opportunity to express our beliefs concerning this 
important exposure draft.
Please contact Allen Fetterman, chair of the Professional Ethics Committee at (212) 867 - 
4000, or Robert H. Colson, NYSSCPA Staff, at (212) 719-8350 if you require further 
information.
Very truly yours,
P. Gerard Sokolski, CPA 
President
NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Comments on
Independence Standards Board 
Exposure Draft
Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework 
for Auditor Independence 
ED 00-2
March 16, 2001
Principal Drafter
Allen Fetterman, CPA, 
Professional Ethics Committee
NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
Comments on
Independence Standards Board 
Exposure Draft
Statement of Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework 
for Auditor Independence 
ED 00-2
Comments of the Professional Ethics Committee
The Professional Ethics Committee of the New York State Society of Certified Public 
Accountants has reviewed the Exposure Draft (ED 00-2) of Statement of Independence Concepts: 
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence. The Committee thinks that the concepts 
enumerated in the Exposure Draft represent a good step in the evolution of independence 
standards applicable to the audits of public companies.
In response to the Questions for Respondents, the Committee has the following thoughts:
1. The definition of auditor independence is appropriate.
2. The goal of auditor independence should be to “support user reliance on the financial 
reporting process.” Enhancing capital market efficiency is a benefit of that goal 
(among other benefits) and not part of that goal.
3. The concepts and basic principles are appropriate and sufficiently operational.
4. The independence risk model is appropriate and comprehensive.
Specifically, in paragraph 28, the last two words, “reputational capital”, are too esoteric 
and subject to misinterpretation. We suggest substituting “reputation”.
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March 27, 2001
Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel:
We have reviewed the Independence Standards Board's (ISB) Exposure Draft (ED) 
00-2, Statement o f  independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework fo r  Auditor 
Independence. We support the framework as proposed and do not have any 
substantive comments on it at this time.
As you know, Jim Schiro and Ken Dakdduk participated in the project task force that 
assisted in the development of the ED. We look forward to their continued 
participation in the effort to finalize a new conceptual framework for auditor 
independence.
If you have any questions, please contact Kenton J. Sicchitano (212-707-6230) or 
Kenneth E. Dakdduk (201-521-3048).
